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CHAPTER  ONE 
1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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"No government can exist without taxation. This money must necessarily be levied on the 
people; and the grand art consists of levying so as not to oppress."  
-Frederick the Great 
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Governments around the world use tax money to provide common public goods and services 
that are not provided by private businesses (Huber, Shubik, & Sunder, 2013). Taxes keep 
roads safe and well-maintained, fund public libraries, keep emergency services like the fire 
department running, and pay for public parks. Taxes are also used to fund various 
government programs that help the poor, such as the provision of basic healthcare and 
education. Most importantly, a nation’s defense, security, and policing services are financed 
primarily by tax money (McGee, 2004). In addition to financing government expenditure, 
taxation is used to redistribute wealth among citizens (Joumard, Pisu, & Bloch, 2013) and 
as a fiscal tool. For example, when demand for goods and services plummets the government 
can reduce the amount of taxes levied so that individuals and firms have increased 
purchasing power; vice versa, when inflation threatens an economy the government can 
increase taxation to dampen demand and keep inflation at bay (Mattesini & Rossi, 2012; 
Ezejiofor, Adigwe, & Echekoba, 2015). 
However, despite the important roles played by taxation, almost everyone abhors 
paying taxes (Ventry, 2011). One popular approach to scientific thinking about stimulating 
tax compliance (i.e. paying one’s taxes) is the economic deterrence approach. A classic 
theoretical perspective along this line is provided in the work of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), who consider individual taxpayers as selfish individuals who calculate the cost-
benefit tradeoff before deciding whether or not to evade taxes. According to this view, 
taxpayers compare the potential cost of evading taxes (the sum of the taxes due plus any 
penalty imposed in case of detection) with the potential benefits (the savings from not paying 
taxes if they manage to escape detection). Following this cost-benefit comparison, and taking 
into account the likelihood of getting caught, taxpayers decide to pay taxes only if their 
expected costs outweigh the corresponding expected benefits (see Wenzel, 2003 for an 
overview).  
However, empirical studies show that economic deterrence is inadequate to explain 
existing compliance levels, given the limited enforcement resources at the disposal of tax 
authorities (see Alm, Clark, & Leibel, 2016; Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Torgler, 
2003, 2008; Wenzel, 2003). In response, scholars have argued that there are a number of 
limitations to the economic deterrence approach. For instance, some argue that human beings 
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are not necessarily selfish and calculative of their own benefits and costs. In fact, individuals 
who strongly identify with a social collective tend to be more concerned with collective 
interests and may not calculate the personal cost to them of contributing for the collective 
benefit (see Huo, 2003; Tyler, & Blader, 2001; Wenzel, 2002). Further qualifying the value 
of the economic deterrence approach, it has been argued that strong reliance on deterrence 
by tax authorities to enforce tax laws will damage taxpayers’ trust in authority and can 
provoke taxpayers to aggressively evade taxes whenever they see the possibility to do so 
(Feld & Frey, 2002; Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai, & Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 
2008). 
Alternative approaches to understanding tax evasion identify social-psychological 
and normative variables as decisive factors in eliciting voluntary tax compliance, rather than 
economic deterrent factors (see Alm et al., 2012; Arrington, 1985; Bărbuţămişu, 2011; 
Bobek et al., 2013; Bobek et al., 2007; Casey & Scholz, 1991). Specifically, procedural 
justice (e.g. Farrar, 2015; Murphy et al., 2016; Wenzel, 2002), distributive justice (e.g. Saad, 
2011; Verboon & Goslinga, 2009; Wenzel, 2003), interactional justice (e.g. Feld & Frey, 
2002; Wenzel, 2006), trust in the tax authority (e.g. Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Wahl et al., 
2010) and normative constraints (e.g. Bobek et al., 2013; Wenzel, 2004) have all been found 
to influence voluntary compliance by taxpayers. Such approaches are also less expensive 
than the deterrent approach, on account of the voluntary cooperation by taxpayers with the 
tax authority, as opposed to the use of extensive tax audit programs and subsequent penalties, 
including the jailing of tax evaders (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Muehlbacher, 
Kirchler, & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Murphy, 2003).  
In this dissertation, I study variables that encourage voluntary (rather than enforced) 
tax compliance. As noted above, the deterrence approach to enforcing tax compliance is 
insufficient to explain prevailing tax compliance behavior, whereas research shows that 
social-psychological factors can help us to understand voluntary compliance. I, therefore, 
pursue a social-psychological paradigm and explore how some of the best-studied variables 
actually relate to one another. In the integration process, I also provide a way to connect 
deterrence and social-psychological approaches. In the following sections I present a brief 
overview of the social-psychological factors of focus in the present dissertation and how 
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they affect voluntary tax compliance behavior. 
1.1 Distributive Justice 
Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the distribution of benefits and burdens 
among members of a group (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Individuals judge the fairness of the 
share of benefits and burdens distributed to them by a system using some implicit norms, 
such as the equity rule (Adams, 1965; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Verboon & Van Dijke, 
2007). A distributive system is perceived to be just when individuals deem that they are 
receiving benefits proportional to their contribution (Adams, 1965; Saad, 2011; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975). In the tax compliance literature, distributive justice refers to the perceived 
fairness of the distribution of tax-funded benefits and tax burdens (see Saad, 2011; Verboon 
& Van Dijke, 2007; Wenzel, 2002, 2003). Because taxpayers do not claim the provision of 
government-supplied goods and services in exact proportion to the tax money paid—so-
called quid pro quo—they often focus on vertical and horizontal equities. Vertical equity 
refers to the relative equitability of the tax burdens of taxpayers with unequal amounts of 
taxable income, whereas horizontal equity refers to the equitability of the tax burdens of 
taxpayers with the same amount of taxable income (see Wenzel, 2002; Saad, 2011). When 
vertical or horizontal equity or both are perceived as low, taxpayers tend not to voluntarily 
comply with their tax obligations (Saad, 2011, Verboon & Goslinga, 2009; Wenzel, 2003).  
1.2 Procedural Justice 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness in the decision-making processes that 
resolve disputes and allocate resources (Leventhal, 1976, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). 
The fairness of these processes is evaluated against six criteria—consistency, bias 
suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness and ethicality (Leventhal, 1980). 
Each criterion is explained briefly here. The consistency criterion requires that allocative 
procedures be applied consistently among different individuals at all times, allowing no room 
for anyone person to be given privileges over anyone else. The bias suppression criterion 
demands that prejudice should be avoided in allocative procedures, as allocative procedures 
that promote preferential treatment or personal self-interest impair procedural fairness. The 
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accuracy criterion requires allocative decisions to be based on accurate information. The 
correctability criterion refers to the revision of faulty decisions through a valid channel. The 
representativeness rule requires the allocation processes to represent the concerns of all 
affected to ensure greater acceptance of the procedures. The final criterion, ethicality, demands 
that allocation procedures be based on prevailing moral and ethical standards. Failure to meet 
the ethicality criterion might lead to a feeling among those impacted that procedural fairness 
is not guaranteed and, thus, result in a decline in their perception of fairness. These procedural 
justice criteria have been empirically supported in various contexts. Colquitt (2001), for 
instance, developed a measurement scale for procedural justice taking into account the 
application of these six criteria; this scale has been extensively used in studies of organizational 
behavior (e.g. Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Walumbwa, Wu, & Orwa, 
2008; Wang, Liu, Luo, Ma, & Liu, 2016). 
Authorities that use fair decision-making procedures enjoy more positive responses 
from their followers (see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, & Cohn, 
2002; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 
1992). Empirical studies specifically show that procedural justice leads to positive attitudes 
and cooperative responses from members of social collectives in many areas, including work 
relations (e.g. Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000), law enforcement (Barkworth 
& Murphy, 2015), support for authorities (e.g. Tyler & Degoey, 1995), and cooperative 
alliances (e.g. Luo, 2005). The tax compliance literature also documents a positive 
relationship between fair decision-making procedures and taxpayers’ compliance with tax 
laws and regulations (e.g. Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2016; Wenzel, 
2002).  
One influential theory that explains why citizens respond to high procedural justice 
with voluntary tax compliance is the fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). The fairness 
heuristic theory holds that people, in their relations with authorities, are faced with a 
fundamental social dilemma. This is because contributing to a collective (such as by 
voluntarily paying one’s taxes) offers them a sense of identity and belonging and 
opportunities for improved outcomes (e.g. a better-functioning country), but also possible 
exploitation and identity damage due to abusive or rejecting authorities (Lind, 2001; Van 
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Dijk, Parks, & Van Lange, 2013). Procedural justice communicates that authorities can be 
trusted not to abuse their power and this, in turn, stimulates a willingness to contribute to the 
collective, for instance, by voluntarily complying with the decisions and goals of the 
authorities representing the collective (Kugler & Bornstein, 2013; Lind, 2001). 
1.3 Mediators and Moderators of the Relationship between Procedural Justice and 
Voluntary Tax Compliance 
Despite its theorized effect on cooperation with authorities representing social collectives, 
procedural justice does not always predict cooperation. More specifically, our understanding 
of why and when procedural justice stimulates cooperation with authorities is limited (see 
Van Dijke et al., 2012; Van Dijke et al., 2015). Integrating the effect of procedural justice 
on cooperative behaviors with other theoretically-sound instrumental and psychological 
variables can uncover the reason why procedural justice does not always predict cooperation 
with authorities (Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015; Kirchler, 2007; Van Dijke 
et al., 2010). In the context of tax compliance behavior, the need for integrating the effect of 
procedural justice on voluntary compliance has recently received the attention of scholars 
(Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015; Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai, & Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler et 
al., 2008; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). Although there have been integration endeavors in 
the West, to my knowledge, there has not been any study in developing countries that 
integrates the effects of the various factors that influence tax compliance behavior. 
This dissertation attempts to fill two gaps in the extant tax compliance literature: 
First, most integrative tax compliance studies (see Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; 
Lisi, 2014; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010; Wenzel, 2002) focus on developed economies such 
as the US, Australia, and Europe, making it difficult to compare the situation in developing 
economies with those in developed ones. Second, some important theories and models—
such as the fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), relational models of procedural justice 
(Lind and Tyler, 1988), the slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 
2008), and the sense-making analysis of justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996)—were 
tested in developed countries and their propositions have not been checked in developing 
country contexts. To address these two gaps, I have included samples of taxpayers from a 
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developing country (Ethiopia) and a developed country (the US) and conducted standalone 
analyses, as well as a comparison of the situations, in both countries. In order to examine the 
interrelationships between procedural justice, legitimate (and coercive) power, trust, 
identification with the nation, distributive justice and voluntary tax compliance, this 
dissertation describes five field surveys, three of which were conducted in a developing 
country (Ethiopia) and two in a developed country (the US). 
In response to the need for such integration, I propose some intervening variables 
in relation to the effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance in two empirical 
studies and in relation to the effect of distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance in one 
study. In separate studies I: (1) identify the power wielded by the tax authority (both 
legitimate and coercive) as a moderating variable on the effect of procedural justice on 
voluntary tax compliance (I also include trust in the tax authority as a mediator of the 
interactive effect of procedural justice with legitimate and coercive power on voluntary tax 
compliance behavior); (2) identify identification with the nation as a boundary condition for 
the already-established interactive effect of procedural justice and trust in the tax authority 
(Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010); and (3) identify the legitimate power of the tax authority as 
a boundary condition for the interactive effect of the procedural and distributive justice of 
the tax authority in shaping voluntary tax compliance. The first and third studies integrate 
the roles of social-psychological factors and economic deterrence factors and the second 
integrates the roles of social-psychological factors.  
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation 
The reasons why taxpayers comply with their tax obligations are largely unclear. Considered 
individually, economic deterrence, social-psychological factors, and normative factors do 
not sufficiently explain the number of taxpayers that voluntarily comply with tax authorities 
in different countries, particularly given the limited enforcement resources at the disposal of 
such authorities (Kirchler et al., 2008; Torgler, 2003; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010; Verboon 
& Van Dijke, 2007; Wenzel, 2003). This is because integrative effects of these factors 
sometimes explain a much higher proportion of tax compliance than their main effects 
(Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; Wenzel, 2002).  
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Chapter 2 explores how and when the legitimate and coercive power of the tax 
authority moderates the effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance and the 
mediating role of trust on the interactive effect of procedural justice and both (legitimate and 
coercive) forms of power. This study integrates a pervasive instrumental variable, namely, 
the power of the tax authority, with the two most established psychological variables, the 
procedural justice of the tax authority and trust in the authority, in shaping voluntary tax 
compliance behavior. This research builds on the fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) and 
the slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). Based on these 
frameworks, I predicted that procedural justice fosters voluntary tax compliance, particularly 
when the legitimate power of the tax authority is low and when the coercive power of the 
authority is high, and that these interactive effects are mediated by (cognition-based) trust. I 
also predicted that the coercive power of the tax authority is positively related to enforced 
tax compliance. A field study among Ethiopian business owners was devised to test these 
predictions. As such, this research is among the first to integrate social-psychological and 
deterrence-related factors to understand tax compliance behavior in a developing country. 
Chapter 3 investigates the three-way interaction between procedural justice, trust 
and identification with the nation, thus using identification as a boundary condition for the 
already documented interactive effect of trust in the tax authority and procedural justice of 
the authority on voluntary tax compliance (Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). Previous studies 
viewed the moderating role of trust in authority on the procedural justice effect differently. 
One study by Van Dijke & Verboon (2010) found that low (rather than high) trust moderates 
the role of procedural justice on tax compliance. The second, by De Cremer & Tyler (2007), 
found support for high (rather than low) trust as a moderator of the positive effect of 
procedural justice on levels of cooperation. The present study builds on the interaction 
pattern documented by Van Dijke & Verboon (2010) and integrates ideas from the fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) and relational models of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) as frameworks of analysis. Accordingly, I predicted that the 
relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance, which has been found 
particularly among citizens with low (rather than high) trust in tax authorities, is restricted 
to citizens who weakly (rather than strongly) identify with the nation. A field study with 
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samples of Ethiopian and US taxpayers was devised to test this prediction. As a result, this 
research integrates the role of important social-psychological factors that shape voluntary 
tax compliance and obtains support for the arguments in a developing nation (Ethiopia) and 
a developed nation (US)—both of which have strongly divergent tax climates.  
Chapter 4 examines the legitimacy of the tax authority as a boundary condition for 
the interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance. The 
interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice has been widely studied in 
organizational behavior (see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996 for an overview). Most studies 
document that high procedural justice or high distributive justice suffices to predict positive 
reactions to authorities’ decisions. The present study builds on sense-making analysis of 
justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer, Brockner, Fishman, Van Dijke, Van 
Olffen, & Mayer, 2010) as a framework for to extend the abovementioned interactive effect 
of the two components of justice to tax compliance behavior. I predicted that the legitimate 
power of the tax authority moderates the interactive effect of the procedural and distributive 
justice of the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance, such that the Procedural Justice × 
Distributive Justice interaction will be restricted to authorities who have high (rather than 
low) legitimate power. Two field studies among Ethiopian (Study 1) and US (Study 2) 
taxpayers were devised to test this prediction. This research integrates the roles of two often-
studied social-psychological antecedents of tax compliance (i.e. distributive and procedural 
justice) with that of a deterrent factor (i.e. legitimate power) and obtains support for the 
psychological process underlying the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction in 
two diverging tax environments. 
In the final chapter I discuss the findings of the empirical studies. It should be noted 
that all empirical chapters are written as scientific papers, of which the first and second have 
been published, and the third is under review. Thus, they can be read independently of each 
other. However, there is some overlap between the different theoretical introductions. These 
chapters were the result of collaborative research efforts by myself and my two co-authors. 
As such, the papers are formulated in the first person plural (i.e. “we”) rather than first person 
singular (i.e. “I”).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2  POWER, JUSTICE, AND TRUST: A 
MODERATED MEDIATION ANALYSIS OF TAX 
COMPLIANCE AMONG ETHIOPIAN 
BUSINESS OWNERS1 
 
  
                                                          
1 Gobena, L. B. & Van Dijke, M. 
14 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Ideally, taxation is the most reliable source for financing government expenditure 
(Blöchliger & Petzold, 2009; Dziobek et al., 2011). While other sources for financing 
government expenditure have various constraining conditions attached to them, the 
government is free to spend the proceeds from taxation in ways it deems necessary 
(Blöchliger & Petzold, 2009). A worrying fact in this respect is that while the government 
budget in many countries is overwhelmed by deficit financing, many citizens continually evade 
taxes (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Asaminew, 2010; Waud, 1986). Consequently, 
taxpayers’ adherence to applicable taxation laws is something all governments throughout the 
world aim to secure (Bobek et al., 2007). Therefore, understanding what drives tax compliance 
is an important topic for scientific study. 
Nevertheless, the literature on tax compliance of the past 50 years or so suffers from 
two important limitations. First, research has revealed that tax compliance is attributable to a 
range of factors that are economic or social-psychological in nature (Muehlbacher et al., 2011). 
Yet these various factors are usually studied separately. The economic model or deterrence 
approach to tax compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) assumes that the threat of sanctions 
(i.e. the probability of detection and subsequent penalties) shapes taxpayers’ behavior. Many 
empirical studies support this claim (for a review, see Fischer et al., 1992), although some 
studies do not (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Andreoni et al., 1998; Torgler, 2003a, 
2003b). Social psychologists, on the other hand, attribute tax compliance to an array of 
noneconomic factors such as taxpayers’ trust in authorities (Feld & Frey, 2002; Scholz & 
Lubell, 1998; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010) and in other taxpayers (Alm, Kirchler, & 
Muehlbacher, 2012; Frey & Torgler, 2007), how taxpayers perceive the legitimacy of 
authorities (Kogler et al., 2013; Wahl et al., 2010; Wenzel & Jobling, 2006), the manner in 
which tax authorities treat taxpayers (Feld & Frey, 2002, 2007), and personal and social norms 
(Edling et al., 2006; Lederman, 2003; Wenzel, 2004). Regretfully, there is at present little 
integration of deterrence-based and social-psychological perspectives, and hence we lack a 
clear understanding of factors that drive tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 
2008). One reason for this lack of integration may be that deterrence-based perspectives have 
usually focused on enforced tax compliance, whereas social psychological perspectives 
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focused on voluntary compliance (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm, Kirchler, 
Muehlbacher, Gangl, Hofmann, Kogler, & Pollai, 2012).  
A second limitation of the current tax compliance literature is that the vast majority 
of studies have been conducted in developed nations in Europe, Australia, and the United 
States (for reviews see Doyle, Frecknall-Hughes, & Summers, 2009; Palil, 2010). Tax 
compliance has been studied far less often in developing countries (for exceptions see 
Abdul–Razak & Adafula, 2013; Smulders & Naidoo, 2013), and no research in developing 
countries has integrated deterrence-based and social-psychological perspectives on tax 
compliance. Yet the tax environment in many developing countries differs in important ways 
from those in Europe and the US. In developing countries, taxpayers usually do not see 
paying taxes as a contribution towards building common public goods, but rather as a burden 
imposed on them by government (Asaminew, 2010). Moreover, tax authorities often show 
little trust in taxpayers and seem to believe that deterrent actions can solve all problems 
related to tax (non-)compliance. Therefore, taxation environments in developing countries 
often feature so-called “cops and robbers” relationships between taxpayers and the tax 
authority (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
In this article, we will address the two above-mentioned limitations of the tax 
compliance literature. We will integrate the role of the most relevant deterrence factor – that 
is, the power of the tax authority – with a core social psychological antecedent of voluntary 
tax compliance, namely, the procedural justice of the authority. Drawing from the slippery 
slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008), we distinguish 
between legitimate and coercive power on the part of the tax authority. Based on fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), we argue that procedural justice influences voluntary tax 
compliance particularly when legitimate power of the tax authority is low (vs. high) and 
when coercive power is high (vs. low). To explicitly ground our argument in relevant theory, 
we will also argue that the interaction effects of procedural justice with both types of power 
wielded by the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance are mediated by trust in the tax 
authority. Figure 2.1 visually represents our proposed model. We test our model among 
business owners in Ethiopia—a country that is characterized by the type of strained 
relationship between citizens and the tax authorities sketched above (Asaminew, 2010; 
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Vadde & Gundarapu, 2012). 
2.2 Theoretical Background 
2.2.1 Procedural Justice and Tax Compliance 
Procedural justice (i.e. the perceived fairness of decision-making processes and procedures) 
results from a variety of factors (Leventhal, 1980). Typically, procedures are perceived as 
fairer when they are applied consistently over time and across the individuals or groups 
affected (Van den Bos et al., 1996); when they are applied accurately and are not motivated 
by authorities’ self-interest (De Cremer, 2004; Saad, 2011); and when they allow those 
affected to voice their opinions (Lamberton et al., 2014; Tyler et al., 1985; Van den Bos, 
1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical studies show that authorities who enact procedures in a fair manner gain 
more positive responses from members of the collective than authorities who enact 
Figure 2.1. A Visual Representation of How the Legitimate and Coercive Power of the Tax 
Authority Moderate the Effect of Low (vs. High) Procedural Justice on Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Legitimate Power 
_ 
Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Procedural Justice Trust 
+ 
Coercive Power 
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procedures in an unfair manner (Van Dijke et al., 2010; Walker, 1989). One form that 
responses to procedural justice may take is voluntary compliance of the members of the 
collective with the authority. In the context of tax administration, tax authorities that are 
viewed by taxpayers as enacting decision-making procedures in a fair way have been shown 
to enjoy more voluntary tax compliance than authorities that are perceived to be unfair (Feld 
& Frey, 2007; Feld & Tyran, 2002; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010).  
One influential theory that explains why citizens respond to high procedural justice 
with tax compliance is fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). Fairness heuristic theory notes 
that people, in their relations with authorities, are faced with a fundamental social dilemma. 
This results because contributing to a collective (such as by voluntarily paying one’s taxes) 
offers a sense of identity and belonging and opportunities for improved outcomes (e.g. a 
better functioning country), but also possible exploitation and identity damage due to 
abusive or rejecting authorities (Lind, 2001; Van Dijk et al., 2013). Procedural justice 
communicates that authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power. Consequently, it 
stimulates a willingness to contribute to the collective, such as by voluntarily complying 
with the authorities representing the collective (Kugler & Bornstein, 2013; Lind, 2001). 
Fairness heuristic theory proposes an episodic sequence of justice judgments. During 
the “judgmental phase,” individuals observe fairness information (e.g. of procedures) in 
order to assess whether authorities are high in integrity and can thus be trusted not to exploit 
them. In the “use phase,” they use their fairness judgment as input in their decision to 
respond with positive behavior like compliance (Bordignon, 1993; Kugler & Bornstein, 
2013; Lind, 2001; Saad, 2011; Van den Bos et al., 1998; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). In 
support of fairness heuristic theory, research shows that procedural information (e.g. 
receiving versus not receiving voice in the decisions of an authority) influences perceptions 
of procedural justice, particularly when it is unclear whether an authority can be trusted 
(versus when it is clear that an authority either can or cannot be trusted) (Van den Bos et al., 
1998). Studies also show that procedural justice increases trust in the enacting authority 
(Aryee et al., 2002; Hough et al., 2010). Finally, the effect of procedural justice on outcome 
variables, including voluntary tax compliance, has been shown to be mediated by trust 
(Murphy, 2004).   
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Another framework that is useful to understand the effects of trust and procedural 
justice on tax compliance is the “slippery slope framework,” which was developed within 
the tax compliance literature (Kirchler et al., 2008). This framework notes that the tax 
environment can vary on a continuum between an antagonistic climate (i.e. where taxpayers 
and the tax authority work against each other) and a synergistic climate (i.e. where taxpayers 
and the tax authority work together). In antagonistic climates the tax authorities believe that 
taxpayers evade taxes whenever they can and they should be closely followed up; taxpayers, 
for their part, believe that they are persecuted by the tax authority and it is right to hide. In 
synergistic climates taxpayers perceive tax authorities as performing a service for the 
community, and as being part of the same community the individual taxpayers belong to. 
The framework considers tax compliance as being influenced by two major dimensions: trust 
in authorities and power of authorities. Trust (and presumably also its antecedent, procedural 
justice) begets voluntary tax compliance, while power secures enforced compliance.  
2.2.2 Legitimate and Coercive Power, Procedural Justice, and Tax Compliance 
Power is often defined as the ability to realize one’s goals through others (Van Dijke & Poppe, 
2006). Broadly, there are two possible reasons why people comply with power holders. First, 
they may want to avoid the punishment that power holders can inflict upon them (Ariel, 2012). 
Second, there may be a role division between power holders and subordinates that is accepted 
by both parties. In the second scenario, people perceive the authority’s power as legitimate, 
and hence that power is grounded in a shared reality (Kastlunger et al., 2013; Muehlbacher et 
al., 2011). The distinction between legitimate and coercive power is arguably relevant for our 
understanding of tax compliance and, more specifically, our understanding of how power 
interacts with the procedural justice of the tax authority to shape taxpayers’ voluntary 
compliance.  
In its original formulation, the slippery slope framework distinguished legitimate from 
coercive power on the part of the tax authority, but without offering a clear explanation of the 
effect of each type of power on either voluntary or enforced tax compliance. Studies have 
found inconsistent results with regard to the effect of legitimate power on tax compliance, 
some reporting a positive effect on enforced compliance and a negative effect on voluntary 
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compliance (Kastlunger et al., 2013), and others finding no effect on enforced compliance 
and a positive effect on voluntary compliance (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014). In 
this paper, we do therefore not predict any effect of legitimate power on voluntary or 
enforced compliance.  
However, as noted, legitimate power may be relevant as a boundary condition to the 
relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. Tyler (1997) notes 
that legitimate power is the power of an accepted authority to which individuals voluntarily 
defer. A high level of legitimate power thus implies that the tax authority is perceived as 
deserving compliance. In terms of fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) this means that when 
authorities are seen as having legitimate power, they ought to be complied with regardless of 
the tax authority’s level of procedural justice. As a consequence, high levels of legitimate 
power on the part of the tax authority should make procedural justice less relevant in shaping 
citizens’ decisions on whether or not to voluntarily comply with the tax authority. This 
argument culminates in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Procedural justice is related to voluntary tax compliance, but this 
effect should be found only when the tax authority wields low (vs. high) legitimate power. 
Coercive power, on the other hand, is the power on the part of tax authorities that 
compels taxpayers to pay taxes not out of the belief that taxes help to finance common public 
goods, but out of fear of tax audits and consequent punishments (Feld & Frey, 2002, 2007; 
Kastlunger et al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 2008). In other words, coercive power is power that 
directs individuals against their will (Kirchler et al., 2008: 213). This form of power is needed 
to enforce tax laws in a hostile tax climate where there is no mutual understanding between the 
tax authority and taxpayers. Prior research has consistently found a positive relationship 
between coercive power and enforced tax compliance, but no relationship between coercive 
power and voluntary compliance (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014; Kastlunger et al., 
2013). In line with this prior work, we argue:  
Hypothesis 2. Coercive power of the tax authority is associated with an increase in 
enforced tax compliance. 
Important for the present purposes, we argue that coercive power also plays a role in 
the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. Specifically, 
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coercive power implies a lack of reciprocal respect and sympathy between taxpayers and tax 
authorities (Font & Blanco, 2007; Muehlbacher et al., 2011). Therefore, from the perspective 
of fairness heuristic theory, a high level of coercive power of the tax authority may lead to the 
fear that the authority may abuse its power. In this situation, citizens are likely to consider the 
fairness of organizational procedures to assess whether they should comply with the authority 
or not. This should lead to relatively strong effects of procedural justice on voluntary 
compliance when authorities have high (vs. low) coercive power. This argument leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Procedural justice is related to voluntary tax compliance, but this 
effect is pronounced particularly when the tax authority has high (vs. low) coercive power. 
2.2.3 Trust as a Mediator of the Effect of Procedural Justice on Voluntary Tax 
Compliance, Moderated by the Power of Tax Authority 
To better ground our predictions in relevant theory, i.e. fairness heuristic theory and the 
slippery slope framework, we address the role of trust in the tax authority in mediating the 
proposed unique interaction effects of coercive power and legitimate power with procedural 
justice on voluntary tax compliance. Trust is defined as the “willingness to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). Taxpayers who perceive the tax 
authority as being high in procedural justice are more likely to trust the authority, and this 
increases compliance (Murphy, 2004).  
The slippery slope framework considers trust as one of the major factors that shape 
voluntary tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). Recent refinements of the framework, 
however, distinguish between reason-based and implicit trust (Gangl et al., 2015; Gangl et 
al., 2012).  Reason-based trust results from a deliberate decision grounded in goal 
achievement (i.e. the trustor evaluates whether the trustee pursues a goal that is important to 
him/her), dependency (i.e. the trustor is dependent, in some way, on the trustee), internal 
factors (e.g. the trustor evaluates the trustee as competent, willing, and harmless), and 
external factors (e.g. perceived opportunities and dangers of the trustor in the relationship). 
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Implicit trust is an automatic, unintentional, and unconscious reaction to stimuli originating 
from associative and conditioned learning processes in which shared social identities are 
likely to arise. These two types of trust, respectively, mirror the established distinction in the 
trust literature between cognition- and affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995; Ng & Chua, 
2006).  
Whereas cognition-based trust  involves a rational and conscious assessment of the 
trustee’s track record and reputation for dependability, reliability, and professionalism 
(Colquitt et al., 2012), affect-based trust is a feeling towards another party that goes beyond 
rational assessments and consequently entails emotional investments and genuine care and 
concern (Johnson & Grayson, 2005; Schaubroeck et al., 2011). Because validated scales are 
readily available to measure cognition- and affect-based trust, we will focus on these types 
of trust in this paper. We argue that affect-based trust is unlikely to be relevant in explaining 
compliance in the context of the relationship between governments and their citizens in a 
developing country such as Ethiopia with a “cops and robbers” relationship between 
authorities and taxpayers (Kastlunger et al., 2013; Muehlbacher et al., 2011). Even in 
developed nations, taxation continues to be perceived as a burden rather than a contribution 
to societal welfare, as it increases costs and lowers business profits or individual income 
(Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm & McClellan, 2012; Torgler, 2011).  However, 
cognition-based trust may play a clear role in the relationship between governments and 
taxpayer citizens in situations where the track records of government performance convince 
the taxpayers to view their government as competent and concerned about their welfare.  
As noted, fairness heuristic theory predicts that taxpayers will attend to the fairness of 
decisions enacted by the tax authority in order to assess whether this authority can be trusted 
not to take advantage of them (Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). This 
assessment of the authority’s trustworthiness is then used as information in deciding whether 
or not to comply with the authority. In line with this argument, Gangl et al. (2015) and 
Hofmann et al. (2014) found that reason-based trust leads to voluntary tax compliance. We 
articulated this proposed relationship into an effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance mediated by cognition-based trust and moderated by legitimate power, as prior 
studies focused only on the main effects of these variables. More specifically, in line with the 
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dynamics proposed by Gangl et al. (2015) and Gangl et al. (2012), we argue that (cognition-
based) trust in the tax authority (resulting from procedural justice) should lead to voluntary tax 
compliance; but this effect of trust on voluntary tax compliance will be found only when the 
tax authority is perceived to wield low (vs. high) legitimate power. When authorities are seen 
as being high in legitimate power, they ought to be complied with regardless of the level of 
cognition-based trust one has in this authority. The above arguments result in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Procedural justice is related to voluntary tax compliance via the 
mediating mechanism of (cognition-based) trust in the tax authority. Yet cognition-based 
trust is related to voluntary tax compliance only when the tax authority wields low (vs. high) 
legitimate power. 
We also predict that trust is relevant as a mediator in the effect of procedural justice of 
the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance, moderated by coercive power. Drawing on 
fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) we argue that citizens will observe procedural justice 
information to assess whether the tax authority can be trusted not to abuse its power, 
particularly when this authority has high coercive power. This is because high coercive 
power makes it more likely that the authority actually can damage the interests and identity 
of citizens (Gangl et al., 2015; Kastlunger et al., 2013). This argument culminates in the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Procedural justice is related to voluntary tax compliance via the 
mediating mechanism of trust in the tax authority. Yet the relationship between procedural 
justice and trust should be pronounced particularly when the tax authority has high (vs. low) 
coercive power.  
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Respondents 
We gathered data from 231 small and large business owners and/or their accountants in the 
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. 
Of the respondents, 134 reported their gender as male, 83 as female, and 14 did not 
indicate their gender. With regard to age, 47% were between 20 and 30 years old; 31% between 
23 
 
 
31 and 40; 14% between 41 and 50; 1% between 51 and 60; 1% above 60 years old; and 6% 
did not indicate their age. Two percent of the respondents had completed an elementary 
education only, 7% had completed a high school education, 28% had a (2-year) college 
diploma, 50% had a bachelor’s degree, and 9% had completed a master’s degree. With respect 
to their annual company earnings, 33.5% of the respondents reported to have had an annual 
earnings of 50,000–100,000 Ethiopian Birr (1 Birr = approximately USD .55); 13.7% had 
earned 100,000–300,000 Birr; 13.3% had earned 300,000–500,000 Birr; 3.8% had earned 
500,000–700,000 Birr; 10.4% had earned 700,000–1,000,000 Birr; 25.3% had earned more 
than 1,000,000 Birr. Sixteen percent of the respondents reported to have had less than 2 years 
of experience with the tax authority; 46.4% had 2–6 years; 19.6% had 6–10 years; 12.4% 
had 10–20 years; 5.6% had greater than 20 years of experience. 
2.3.2 Procedure  
A printed questionnaire was used to collect data for this study. The items were translated into 
the Amharic language to enhance ease of understanding by our respondents using a translation-
back-translation procedure. A total of 300 questionnaires were distributed to business owners 
and/or their accountants on a random selection basis (i.e. a questionnaire was given to every 
fourth taxpayer who came to four different branches of the tax authority to pay business income 
tax, while awaiting their turns). Of these, 241 questionnaires were returned by the respondents. 
Some respondents skipped a few questions, and those unanswered questions were considered 
as missing data. Accordingly, a total of 231 usable questionnaires could be included in the 
analyses.  
2.3.3 Measures 
We measured procedural justice with an 11-item scale from Murphy (2004). Item examples 
are “The tax authority gives equal consideration to the views of all Ethiopians” and “The tax 
authority considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions” (1= completely 
disagree, 5 = completely agree). We averaged these items into a procedural justice scale. 
We included cognition- as well as affect-based trust as a strong test of our prediction 
that coercive power and legitimate power moderate the effect of procedural justice on 
24 
 
 
voluntary tax compliance as mediated by cognition- rather than affect-based trust. We 
measured cognition-based trust with the 6-item scale developed by McAllister (1995). We 
slightly adapted the items to fit the context of trust in the tax authority. Item examples are 
“The tax officials approach their job with professionalism and dedication” and “Given these 
officials’ track record, I see no reason to doubt their competence and preparation for their job” 
(1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). Based on the results of a reliability 
analysis, we removed the item “If people knew more about these officials and their 
background, they would be more concerned and monitor their performance more closely.” 
(Doing this resulted in  improving from .67 to .72.) We averaged the remaining five items 
into one scale. We measured affect-based trust with the 5-item scale from McAllister (1995).  
We slightly adapted the items to fit the context of trust in the tax authority. Item examples are 
“The tax officials and I have a sharing relationship; we can both freely share our ideas, feelings, 
and hopes” and “I can talk freely to these officials about difficulties I am having regarding tax 
and know that they will want to listen” (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). We 
averaged the items into one scale. 
We measured voluntary tax compliance with the 10-item scale2 from Kirchler and 
Wahl (2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem “When I pay my taxes as required by the 
Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so...”) are “…because to me it’s obvious that this is 
what you do” and “…to support the state and other citizens” (1 = completely disagree, 5 = 
completely agree).We averaged the items to create a voluntary tax compliance index. 
We measured enforced tax compliance with the 8-item scale from Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem “When I pay my taxes as required by the 
Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so...”) are “…because a great many tax audits are 
carried out” and “…because the tax office often carries out audits” (1 = completely disagree, 
5 = completely agree). We averaged the items to create an enforced tax compliance index. 
We measured the tax authority’s legitimate power with a 5-item scale from Kastlunger 
et al. (2013). Item examples are “Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases” 
                                                          
2 Using the abridged 5-item scales for voluntary and enforced tax compliance (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010) revealed 
results that were essentially the same to the results presented in this chapter.  
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and “Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way” (1 = completely disagree, 5 = 
completely agree). Based on the results of a reliability analysis, we decided to drop the 
following item: “Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly.” (Doing this resulted in 
 improving from .44 to .67). We averaged the items into a legitimate power scale.  
We measured the tax authority’s coercive power with a 5-item scale taken from 
Kastlunger et al. (2013). Item examples are “Tax authorities primarily aim to punish” and 
“Tax authorities’ interventions are too severe” (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely 
agree). We averaged the items into a coercive power scale. 
2.4 Results 
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We tested Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 with hierarchical regression analyses3. In step 1, 
we entered the main effects of procedural justice, legitimate power, and coercive power. In 
step 2, we entered the Procedural Justice x Legitimate Power interaction and the Procedural 
Justice x Coercive Power interaction. (We standardized procedural justice, legitimate power, 
and coercive power before calculating the interaction terms.) Table 2.2 presents the results 
of the analysis. 
Table 2.1. Regression Results of the Study for the Procedural Justice x Power Interactions 
 
 
Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Enforced Tax 
Compliance 
   Step 1, R2, R2adj .01, -.01 .12*, .10* 
   Step 2, R2, R2adj, R2change .04*, .02*, .04* .13, .11, .01 
Procedural justice .08 (1.11) -.04 (-.49) 
Legitimate Power .04 (.56) -.07 (-1.01) 
Coercive Power .002 (.02) .33** (4.65)  
Legitimate Power x Procedural Justice -.15* (-2.18) .11 (1.72) 
Coercive Power x Procedural Justice .14* (2.03) .003 (.04) 
N = 231 
Table presents  coefficients at step 2 and t values in parentheses.  
*: p < .05.  
**: p < .01.  
The Procedural Justice x Legitimate Power interaction significantly predicted 
                                                          
3 We did not include demographic variables as controls in our analyses following Carlson and Wu’s (2012) guide 
that suggests excluding control variables when a clear argument cannot be offered as to why including these controls 
would improve the estimation of effects of theoretical interest (“when in doubt, leave them out”), such as is the case 
when they are not significantly correlated with the independent variables. Analyses in which we included the 
demographic variables as controls revealed results that are essentially the same as those reported in this chapter. 
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voluntary tax compliance. Figure 2.2 visually depicts this effect. We further probed this 
interaction effect with simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). In support of 
Hypothesis 1, these analyses showed that the relation between procedural justice and 
voluntary tax compliance was significant when legitimate power was low (at 1 SD below 
the mean), β = -1.01, F(1, 209) = 4.76, p = .04.  However, the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance was not significant when legitimate power 
was high (at 1 SD above the mean), β =- .01, F(1, 209) = 4.76, p = .26. Figure 2.2 shows the 
shape of this interaction. 
 
Figure 2.2.  The Relation between Procedural Justice and Voluntary Tax Compliance as a 
Function of the Legitimate Power of the Tax Authority 
Furthermore, as predicted in Hypothesis 2, coercive power of the tax authority is 
associated with enhanced enforced tax compliance. However, legitimate power of the tax 
authority did not significantly influence enforced tax compliance.  
The Procedural Justice x Coercive Power interaction also significantly predicted 
voluntary tax compliance. Figure 2.3 visually depicts this effect. Subsequent simple slopes 
analyses showed that the relation between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance 
was significant when coercive power was high (at 1 SD above the mean), β = .99, F(5, 209) 
= 1.93, p =.05. However, the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax 
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compliance was not significant when coercive power was low (at 1 SD below the mean), β 
= .003, F(5, 209) = 1.93, p =.27.  
 
Figure 2.3.  The Relation between Procedural Justice and Voluntary Tax Compliance as a 
Function of the Coercive Power of the Tax Authority 
We used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2010; model 21) to test our moderated 
mediation model implied in Hypotheses 4 and 5 (see Figure 2.1). We included procedural 
justice as independent variable and voluntary tax compliance as a dependent variable. We 
included both cognition- and affect-based trust as potential mediators of the relationship 
between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. We included coercive power as a 
moderator of the path from procedural justice to cognition- and affect-based trust and 
legitimate power as a moderator of the path from cognition- and affect-based trust to the 
voluntary tax compliance in the model. Table 2.3 provides these results. 
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Table 2.2. Moderated Mediation Analysis with Legitimate and Coercive Power as 
Moderators and Voluntary Compliance as a Dependent Variable (N =231) 
Mediator Variable Model  
 Outcome Variable: Cognition-
based Trust 
Outcome Variable: Affect-
based Trust 
 B (SE) t p B (SE) t p 
Procedural Justice .67 (.05) 12.38 .00 .67 (.05)      12.21      .00       
Coercive Power .03 (.05)       .50       .62      -.07 (.05)       -1.33       .19           
Procedural Justice 
x Coercive Power 
 
.04 (.05) 
 
.86 
 
.39     
 
.01 (.05)      
 
.03       
 
.98      
Dependent Variable Model    
 Outcome Variable: Voluntary Compliance 
 B (SE) t p 
Cognition-based Trust .17 (.08) 2.19 .03 
Affect-based Trust .09 (.08)      1.19        .24      
Procedural Justice -.09 (.08)      -1.12       .26    
Cognition-based Trust x Legitimate 
Power 
-.17 (.08)     -2.19       .03     
Affect-based Trust x Legitimate Power .06 (.07)       .84       .40    
Conditional Indirect Effect at Specific Levels of the Moderator 
Mediator Moderator: Legitimate 
Power 
 
Indirect Effect      
LL 95% 
CI 
UL 95% 
CI 
Cognition-based 
Trust 
-1.01 (-1 SD from the 
mean) 
.21  .04       .42 
-.01 (0 SD from the mean) .11  -.01       .22 
1.0 (+1 SD from the mean) .01  -.20       .22       
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As can be seen in Table 2.3, procedural justice affected both cognition-based trust and 
affect-based trust. Coercive power did not moderate the effect of procedural justice on 
cognition- and affect-based trust. However, in support of our prediction, legitimate power 
moderated the path from cognition-based (but not affect-based) trust to voluntary tax 
compliance.  
A bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (CI) confirmed that the indirect effect of 
procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance via cognition-based trust was significant when 
the legitimate power of the tax authorities was low (at 1 SD below the mean), but not when it 
was high (at 1 SD above the mean). This supports Hypothesis 4. As can be seen in Table 2.3, 
we found no evidence that coercive power moderates the path from procedural justice to either 
of the two types of trust. Hence, Hypothesis 5 was not supported. 
2.5 Discussion 
In this study we investigated the unique moderating roles of two types of power of the tax 
authority and the mediating mechanism of trust in the tax authority in the relationship between 
the procedural justice of the authority and voluntary tax compliance. We also examined the 
effects of the power of the tax authority (i.e. legitimate and coercive power) on enforced tax 
compliance. We tested our hypotheses in a unique sample of Ethiopian business owners. We 
showed that procedural justice was associated with voluntary tax compliance only when 
legitimate power of the tax authority was low and when coercive power of the authority was 
high. We also showed that the moderating role of legitimate (but not coercive) power of the 
tax authority on voluntary tax compliance occurs because procedural justice leads to voluntary 
compliance via the mediating mechanism of cognition-based (but not affect-based) trust, and 
the relationship between cognition-based trust and voluntary tax compliance is moderated by 
legitimate power. Finally, we showed that only coercive power predicts enforced tax 
compliance. In the following sections, we discuss the implications and limitations of this 
research.  
2.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
Our research is, first of all, relevant to the slippery slope framework of tax compliance. This 
32 
 
 
framework and subsequent empirical studies claim that trust in authorities generally affects 
voluntary tax compliance, whereas the power of the tax authority affects enforced 
compliance (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 
2008; Muehlbacher et al., 2011). The framework also posits that power and trust moderate 
each other’s effect on compliance. Trust should matter most when power is low; when power 
is at its maximum, trust is less relevant because authorities can enforce maximum 
compliance. Conversely, power should matter most when trust is low; when trust is at its 
maximum, variations in power are less relevant because citizens contribute their share 
voluntarily, regardless of the level of power. Independent from this claim, scholars have 
distinguished legitimate from coercive power. These studies have found that coercive power 
predicts enforced compliance (Hofmann et al., 2014; Kastlunger et al., 2013). Yet, results 
for legitimate power have been inconsistent, with some studies reporting a positive effect on 
enforced compliance and a negative effect on voluntary compliance (Kastlunger et al., 
2013), and others finding no effect on enforced compliance and a positive effect on voluntary 
compliance (Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014). Our research connects these various 
claims in a theoretically meaningful way. We show that coercive and legitimate power both 
have a role to play in shaping voluntary compliance by oppositely moderating the effect of 
an established antecedent of trust, procedural justice, on this type of compliance.  
Our research is also relevant to fairness heuristic theory. This theory has found broad 
application outside of the tax compliance literature (mostly in organizational psychology). 
As noted, Lind (2001) argued that in the judgment phase, fairness judgments and the 
resulting trustworthiness assessments are formed. Subsequently, in the use phase, these 
assessments are used to decide whether or not to cooperate with the authority. Prior studies 
that tested fairness heuristic theory focused on the judgment phase (e.g. Van den Bos et al., 
1998), including studies that applied fairness heuristic theory to tax compliance (Van Dijke 
& Verboon, 2010). However, unlike our work, prior work did not focus on the use phase in 
fairness heuristic theory. Showing that trust (as resulting from procedural justice) interacts 
with legitimate power to relate to voluntary tax compliance thus clearly extends the scope 
of application and testing of fairness heuristic theory. 
More generally, this research contributes to integrating the deterrence and social 
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psychological approaches to tax compliance by testing our prediction that the main 
deterrence tool (i.e. power of tax authority) and a pervasive element of justice (i.e. procedural 
justice) interact with each other in shaping voluntary tax compliance. Procedural justice has 
been studied previously as an antecedent of voluntary tax compliance (Murphy, 2004; 
Murphy & Tyler, 2008). However, a nuanced perspective is presented on integration 
between the two literatures by the unique moderating roles of legitimate and coercive power 
on the part of the tax authority in the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary 
tax compliance. 
Finally, unlike most of the tax compliance literature, which has usually addressed 
developed nations (Doyle, Frecknall-Hughes, & Summers, 2009; Palil, 2010), we conducted 
this study in a developing country. It is, in this respect, worth noting that the mechanisms 
proposed in fairness heuristic theory (e.g. the fundamental social dilemma in which 
procedural justice is used as heuristic information) are framed as culturally invariant, as are 
the prime mechanisms in the slippery slope framework. We are the first to show that the 
workings of some of these proposed mechanisms do generalize to a developing nation.  
2.5.2 Practical Implications 
Developing countries in general and Sub-Saharan African countries in particular are 
characterized by weak tax administration, extensive tax evasion, corruption, and coercion 
(Fjeldstad & Therkildsen, 2008; McKerchar & Evans, 2009). Ethiopia is one of the Sub-
Saharan African countries that are characterized by coercive authorities (including tax 
authorities) and citizens with low tax morale (Bahl & Bird, 2008). The country secures the 
lowest tax to GDP ratio (about 10%) in the region (Daba, 2014). The size of the underground 
economy, which most often is taken as a proxy for the level of tax morale of citizens (Torgler 
& Schneider, 2007), has been estimated to be about 36% of the country’s GDP in the year 
2010 (Asaminew, 2010). One thing that is likely to make tax evasion even worse in Ethiopia 
is the fact that most business transactions are effected in cash, leaving no evidence for an 
audit trail. Cash economies are known to make enforcement of tax laws more difficult 
compared to those where transactions can be traced electronically after they have occurred 
(Benshalom, 2012; Devos, 2014). Therefore, taxation environments in developing countries 
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like Ethiopia often feature so-called “cops and robbers” relationships between taxpayers and 
the tax authority (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
In the context of these characteristics of the taxation climate in Ethiopia, we believe 
that our research has distinct practical implications. First, we find that justice plays a pivotal 
role in nurturing voluntary tax compliance specifically when the tax authority’s legitimacy is 
low. In developing nations such as Ethiopia, authorities usually are low in legitimate power 
(Van de Walle, 2011). Therefore, our findings highlight the need for tax authorities to be 
procedurally just, especially in those developing countries where legitimacy is known to be 
low. 
Furthermore, prior work identified the limitations of a repressive approach (i.e. based 
on coercive power). Trying to stimulate tax compliance by means of coercion is costly 
(Kirchler et al., 2008; Murphy, 2004; Scott & Grasmick, 1981), as the majority of the taxpayers 
will look for all possible loopholes for evasion. Moreover, taking legal actions against a large 
number of tax evaders drains government revenue. This is probably especially the case in 
countries such as Ethiopia. Interestingly, our research shows that a strong focus on coercive 
power in fact makes procedural justice more effective in stimulating voluntary tax compliance 
(and injustice more effective in undermining voluntary compliance). It is therefore advisable 
for tax authorities to invest in creating a procedurally just tax environment; this is particularly 
true for authorities in developing nations, which tend to focus on coercion in their relationship 
with their citizens. 
Finally, a more general observation is that most of the predictions of both fairness 
heuristic theory and the slippery slope framework were supported in the context of a 
developing country. Therefore, policy makers in developing countries may take account of 
the relationships that are proposed in and the assumptions underlying fairness heuristic 
theory and the slippery slope framework in their policy design. 
2.5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
As with all research, the present study is not without limitations: First, the design of the 
study was cross-sectional. Therefore, the results should be interpreted cautiously. Future 
research is warranted to clarify the causal links between the variables using experimental or 
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longitudinal designs. Yet it should be noted that experimental (e.g. Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, 
& Commissioners, 2009; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010) and longitudinal (Murphy & Tyler, 
2008) studies already revealed the causal effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance. 
Another limitation is that we did not measure characteristics of the company that the 
respondents owned, such as their size (e.g. the number of employees). Owning (and being 
responsible for) a large company may be a different experience psychologically than owning 
a small company (in which tax compliance at least is based more on the owner’s own 
intentions and behavior). Future research should include more extensive measures of the 
taxpayers’ background, including company characteristics. 
We learned only during the process of getting back the filled-out questionnaires that 
a small minority of questionnaires were filled out by accountants of the firms. Yet we did 
not measure this and thus could not analyze the differences in results when the questionnaires 
were completed by owners and accountants. We therefore suggest for future research to 
focus on addressing the need to analyze what differences could arise as a result of owners 
vs. accountants filling out surveys of our type.  
It was impossible to randomly sample taxpayers from a list of income taxpayers 
owing to refusal of the tax authority to share taxpayers’ records with us. We therefore 
resorted to systematic sampling of taxpayers, who were in the queue for paying their income 
taxes at four different branches of the tax authority over three months (January-March, 
2013). The fact that those taxpayers filled out the questionnaire while at the tax authority for 
tax payment does not imply that they are more honest taxpayers than those who were not in 
this queue, as a majority of the taxpayers pay their taxes in fear of perceived subsequent 
measures taken by the tax authority (Abdella & Clifford, 2010). We admit, though, that our 
sampling strategy may limit the external validity of our results.  
Finally, our findings are based only on data from a developing country. Hence, we 
suggest that future research test hypotheses both in developing and developed nations, in 
order to arrive at a more complete understanding of cross-cultural dynamics underlying tax 
compliance. We also suggest specific cultural variables that may be included in this research 
to understand the potential difference between countries, such as power distance and 
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individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 2011; Schwartz, 1994).  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The current study is the first to find that coercive and legitimate power may play unique and 
even opposite moderating roles in the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary 
tax compliance. In taking this approach, our findings contribute to integrating economic and 
social-psychological approaches to the study of tax compliance. Furthermore, testing our 
proposed moderated mediation model in a developing country, rather than—as  most prior 
work has done—among taxpayers in Western countries, contributes to developing literature 
on tax compliance that is more ecologically valid. 
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Appendix 
Below is a complete list of the measures used in this paper. All responses were on a Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Procedural Justice (Murphy, 2004) 
Neutrality (Bias Suppression) 
1. The tax authority gives equal consideration to the views of all Ethiopians. 
2. The tax authority gets the kind of information it needs to make informed decisions. 
3. The tax authority is generally honest in the way it deals with people. 
Fairness of Tax Authority 
1. The tax authority considers the concerns of average citizens when making decisions. 
2. The tax authority cares about the position of taxpayers. 
3. The tax authority tries to be fair when making their decisions. 
Respect 
1. The tax authority respects the individual’s rights as a citizen. 
2. The tax authority is concerned about protecting the average citizen’s rights. 
Trustworthy Treatment from the Tax Authority 
1. The tax authority treats people as if they can be trusted to do the right thing. 
Consultation 
1. The tax authority consults widely about how they might change things to make it 
easier for taxpayers to meet their obligations. 
2. The tax authority goes to great lengths to consult with the community over changes 
to their system. 
 
Affect-based Trust (McAllister, 1995) 
1. The tax officials and I have a sharing relationship; we can both freely share our ideas, 
feelings, and hopes. 
2. I can talk freely to these officials about difficulties I am having regarding tax and 
know that they will want to listen. 
3. We would both feel a sense of loss if we could no longer work together. 
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4. If I shared my problems with these officials, I know they would respond 
constructively and caringly. 
5. I would have to say that we have both made considerable emotional investments in 
our working relationship. 
Cognition-based Trust (McAllister, 1995) 
1. The tax officials approach their job with professionalism and dedication. 
2. Given these officials’ track record, I see no reason to doubt their competence and 
preparation for their job. 
3. I can rely on these persons not to endanger my business by careless work. 
4. Most taxpayers, even those who aren't close friends of these officials, trust and respect 
them as officials. 
5. Other taxpayers I know who must interact with these officials consider them to be 
trustworthy. 
6. If people knew more about these officials and their background, they would be more 
concerned and monitor their performance more closely. 
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority (Kastlunger et al., 2013) 
1. Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases. 
2. Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way. 
3. Tax evasion is likely to be detected. 
4. Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly. 
5. Due to their knowledge and competence, tax authorities are able to detect quite 
every act of tax evasion. 
Coercive Power of Tax Authority (Kastlunger et al., 2013) 
1. Tax authorities primarily aim to punish. 
2. Tax authorities investigate as long as they find something. 
3. Tax authorities’ interventions are too severe. 
4. Tax authorities nurture hostile feelings towards taxpayers. 
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5. Tax authorities interpret tax laws in order to punish the highest number of 
taxpayers. 
Voluntary Tax Compliance (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010) 
When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so... 
1. ... because I pay my taxes voluntarily. 
2. ... without spending a long time thinking how I could reduce them. 
3. ... because to me it’s obvious that this is what you do. 
4. ... even if tax audits did not exist. 
5. ... to support the state and other citizens. 
6. ... because I like to contribute to everyone’s good. 
7. ... because for me it’s the natural thing to do. 
8. ... because I regard it as my duty as a citizen. 
9. ... even though I know that others do not. 
10. ... because I am sure I am doing the right thing. 
Enforced Tax Compliance (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010) 
When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so.... 
1. ... because I feel forced to pay my taxes. 
2. … because a great many tax audits are carried out. 
3. ... although I would really prefer not to pay any taxes. 
4.... because the tax authority often carries out audits. 
5.... because I know that I will be audited. 
6.... because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe. 
7.... because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention. 
8.… after putting a lot of thought into how I could legally save taxes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3  FEAR AND CARING: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
TRUST, AND COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION 
AS ANTECEDENTS OF VOLUNTARY TAX 
COMPLIANCE4 
 
  
                                                          
4 Gobena, L. B. & Van Dijke, M. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Tax revenue constitutes the lion’s share of funds governments use to finance public 
expenditure. For tax revenue to yield the maximum possible benefit to the public, it must be 
collected in an efficient way – spending as little of the tax revenue as possible in collection 
costs (Bird & Zolt, 2008; Serra, 2003; Slemrod, 1990). In order for tax collection to be 
efficient, authorities need to secure taxpayers’ voluntary compliance with tax laws (Alm, 
Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012). Securing voluntary tax compliance is much more efficient 
than relying on enforced compliance (i.e. threatening citizens with punishment upon tax non-
compliance), as this latter option is very costly, if it can be achieved at all (Alm, Kirchler, 
Muehlbacher, Gangl, Hofmann, Kogler, & Pollai, 2012; Kirchlern et al., 2008). One of the 
most important tools that tax authorities have at their disposal to promote voluntary tax 
compliance is to ensure that citizens perceive decision-making procedures related to tax 
collection as fair (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008).  
Unfortunately, our understanding of when and why such fairness perceptions (i.e. the 
procedural justice of tax authorities) promote voluntary tax compliance is severely limited 
for three reasons. First, prior work addressing this relationship has not always revealed 
consistent results. Some studies revealed that high procedural justice promotes voluntary tax 
compliance (e.g. Alm et al., 1993; Farrar, 2015; Murphy, 2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008); yet 
other studies did not reveal such an effect (e.g. Porcano, 1988; Worsham, 1996) or found it 
on some indices of tax compliance but not on others (Wenzel, 2002). Second, our 
understanding of the processes that may explain the positive effect of procedural justice on 
voluntary tax compliance is incomplete. Some scholars focused on the role of taxpayers’ 
trust in the tax authority in this process, noting that high procedural justice communicates the 
information that authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power, which makes citizens more 
willing to contribute to the collective by voluntarily paying their taxes (Murphy, 2004; Van 
Dijke & Verboon, 2010). Yet other researchers linked the effect of procedural justice on 
voluntary (tax) compliance with citizens’ identification with the nation (e.g. Hartner-
Tiefenthaler et al., 2013; Hartner et al., 2010; Wenzel, 2002). Unfortunately, it is as yet unclear 
how trust and identification processes may relate to one another to explain the relationship 
between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. 
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Third, virtually all studies so far on the relationship between procedural justice and 
tax compliance have been conducted in developed nations in Europe, Australia, and the US 
(see Gobena & Van Dijke, 2016 for an exception). This reflects the more general trend in 
the tax compliance literature that almost all research addressing antecedents of tax 
compliance has been conducted in developed nations (see Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & 
Commissioners, 2009; Palil, 2010, for reviews; for exceptions, see Abdul-Razak & Adafula, 
2013; Smulders & Naidoo, 2013). This is problematic because the tax environment in 
developing countries differs strongly from that in developed countries. For instance, in 
contrast to the situation in developed countries, in developing countries taxpayers and tax 
authorities often show less mutual understanding. Tax authorities in these countries tend to 
be less sympathetic of taxpayers’ difficulties; taxpayers on their part feel persecuted by those 
authorities and are more likely to evade taxes when they see an opportunity to do so 
(Fjeldstad, 2001; Gangl et al., 2015).  
In the present paper, we address these three limitations to our understanding of the 
relationship between the procedural justice of the tax authority and citizens’ voluntary tax 
compliance. Specifically, to understand when procedural justice may predict voluntary tax 
compliance and when this will not be the case, we take a moderator approach and thus focus 
on identifying critical boundary conditions to this effect (Vancouver & Carlson, 2015). As 
moderator variables, we simultaneously consider trust in the tax authority and identification 
with the nation. Integrating arguments from fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) and 
relational models of procedural justice (Blader & Tyler, 2015), we argue that the relationship 
between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance is most pronounced among citizens 
with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authorities who at the same time weakly (vs. strongly) 
identify with their nation. 
We test this proposed three-way interaction effect of procedural justice, trust in the 
tax authority, and identification with the nation on voluntary tax compliance among 
taxpayers in a developing country (Ethiopia) and in a developed country (the US). The tax 
environment in Ethiopia constitutes a typical “cops and robbers” type of climate, whereby 
the tax authority holds the belief that all taxpayers strive to evade taxes whenever situations 
allow them and taxpayers reciprocate by hiding their genuine income and taxable 
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transactions from tax officials (Bekana et al., 2014; Debere, 2014; Gobena & Van Dijke, 
2016; Yesegat & Fjeldstad, 2016). The tax environment in the US is a more advanced setting 
in which the interaction between the tax authority and the taxpayers is undeniably smoother 
than that in developing countries (Alm, 2012; Alm et al., 1993; Alm et al., 1999). Though 
we do not claim that Ethiopia and the US are representatives, respectively, of developing 
and developed economies, they are examples of such economies, and finding support for our 
prediction in both of these distinct tax environments arguably boosts the ecological validity 
of our conclusions. Evidence of the countries’ distinct taxation climates is found in the size 
of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP, which is cited as a proxy for citizens’ tax 
morale (Torgler & Schneider, 2007). This percentage averages 45% for developing countries 
and was estimated at 35.1% for Ethiopia in 2007;  it averages 19% for member countries of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Schneider & 
Enste, 2013) and was estimated at 8.4% for the US in 2015 (Schneider, 2015). 
3.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis  
3.2.1 Procedural Justice and Voluntary Tax Compliance 
Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the decision-making procedures that 
authorities follow to arrive at resource allocation decisions (Leventhal, 1980). It is shaped 
by a multitude of factors, such as the consistent application of procedures over time and 
across all affected, the use of accurate information for decision-making, decisions being free 
from decision-makers’ self-interest, and allowing those affected to voice their opinion in the 
authority’s decisions (Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walker, 
1989). Procedural justice leads to positive attitudes and cooperative responses among 
members of social collectives in a variety of settings, such as law enforcement (Barkworth 
& Murphy, 2015), work relations (e.g. Masterson et al., 2000), and educational settings (e.g. 
Ereş et al., 2014). As noted, procedural justice has also been shown to predict voluntary 
compliance with tax laws (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008), 
although this relationship has not always been found (e.g. Porcano, 1988; Wenzel, 2002; 
Worsham, 1996). 
An influential theory that explains why procedural justice promotes voluntary tax 
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compliance is fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001). This theory notes that investing in a 
collective (such as by voluntarily paying one’s taxes) confers a sense of identity and 
belonging, along with opportunities for improved outcomes (e.g. a better functioning 
country) but also possible exploitation when authorities abuse or reject citizens. Individuals 
respond positively (e.g. with elevated tax compliance) to high procedural justice because it 
informs them that authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power (Lind, 2001; van Dijk 
et al., 2013). Trust is defined as the “willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, 
p. 712).  
Prior studies have tested predictions derived from fairness heuristic theory in the area 
of tax compliance. Gobena and Van Dijke (2016) predicted and found that the relationship 
between procedural justice and tax compliance should be pronounced particularly when the 
tax authority is perceived as having high (rather than low) coercive power or low (rather 
than high) legitimate power because the possibility of exploitation should be particularly 
salient in these situations. Moreover, they also found that the relationship between 
procedural justice and tax compliance, as moderated by legitimate power, was mediated by 
trust in the authority, thus suggesting that procedural justice is considered informative of the 
tax authority’s trustworthiness (see also, e.g. Murphy, 2004; Yang et al., 2009, for other 
research showing that the relationship between procedural justice and cooperative responses 
is mediated by trust in the authority). Other work provided evidence for fairness heuristic 
theory by zooming in on the role of trust in the authority as a moderator of the effect of 
procedural justice on tax compliance. Van Dijke and Verboon (2010) showed that citizens 
with low (vs. high) trust in the tax authority – and who thus particularly fear exploitation by 
the authority – respond more strongly with tax compliance to procedural justice information 
(see also De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; van den Bos et al., 1998, for other work that considered 
trust as a moderator of procedural justice effects). 
The effects of procedural justice on compliance with authorities have also been 
explained in terms of identification with the nation. Identification with the nation is defined 
as the “belief in a shared culture, history, traditions, symbols, kinship, language, religion, 
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territory, founding moments, and destiny” (Guibernau, 2004, p. 134). Identification with the 
nation stimulates commitment to the welfare of the nation through internalization of the 
collective benefits (Wenzel & Jobling, 2006), and this enhances voluntary cooperation (van 
Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz & Lavine, 2007), 
including payment of one’s taxes as they come due (Wenzel, 2007). The group-value model 
(Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational model of cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2003) assert 
that people consider fair decision-making by authorities representing the collective as 
identity information; being treated fairly tells people that they are respected members, 
whereas unfair treatment tells them that they are less valued, less respected members (Tyler, 
1989; Tyler & Blader, 2000).  
In support of these models, some studies show that the identity information that is 
communicated by decision-making procedures is most impactful among group members 
caring most about the group. For instance, people who are strongly committed to an 
organization react more strongly to perceived fairness than less committed organization 
members (Brockner et al., 1992). Moreover, the support for procedurally fair, rather than 
unfair, authorities is more pronounced among people who strongly identify with the relevant 
collective (Tyler et al., 1996; Tyler & Degoey, 1995), and the effect of procedural justice on 
self-perceived respect is restricted to people who identify strongly with the relevant 
collective (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2008). Within the tax compliance literature, procedural 
justice has also been shown to be particularly effective in promoting tax compliance among 
citizens who strongly identify with their country (Wenzel, 2002). 
3.2.2 Integrating the Roles of Trust and Identification 
As noted, the extant literature documents trust as both a mediator (e.g. Murphy, 2004; Yang 
et al., 2009) and a moderator (e.g. De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010) 
of the relationship between procedural justice and cooperative responses such as voluntary 
compliance with authorities. The present research extends work that has viewed trust as a 
moderator of procedural justice effects on cooperative responses. From the perspective of 
fairness heuristic theory, trust is relevant to consider as a moderator of procedural justice 
effects, as low trust in an authority implies fear of exploitation. This makes individuals focus 
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more strongly on procedural justice (as an indicator of authority integrity), consequentially 
making procedural justice effects stronger (Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). In the present 
paper we argue that this Procedural Justice × Trust interaction on voluntary tax compliance 
is further moderated by citizens’ level of identification with the nation. Specifically, we 
argue that the fear of being taken advantage of (as implied by low trust) may be less relevant 
to individuals who identify strongly with the collective. We expect this because such 
individuals have internalized collective  
goals and want to support the collective, irrespective of the costs to themselves and their 
personal gains (De Cremer, 2005; van Lange, 1999). Among citizens who strongly identify 
with the nation, low trust should be less likely to strengthen the effect of procedural justice 
on voluntary compliance, as high identifiers care less about their own interests (De Cremer, 
2005; Frey & Meier, 2004). (Figure 3.1 visually presents the conceptual model of our study.) 
These arguments culminate in our hypothesis: 
Identification with the nation moderates the interaction effect of procedural justice of 
the tax authorities and trust in these authorities on voluntary tax compliance, such that 
procedural justice is positively related with voluntary tax compliance primarily when trust 
is low (vs. high) and, simultaneously, identification is low (vs. high). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual Model of How Identification with the Nation Moderates the 
Interaction Effect of Procedural Justice and Trust on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
Identification with 
the Nation 
Trust 
Procedural Justice Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
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3.3 Study Overview 
As noted, we tested our hypothesis in a sample of Ethiopian working professionals and a 
sample of US working professionals. We conducted a cross-sectional survey in which we 
measured our predictor variables – procedural justice, trust, and identification with the nation 
– as well as the criterion variable – voluntary tax compliance – at a single point in time. To 
establish the discriminant validity of our findings, we also included enforced tax compliance 
as a criterion variable (in addition to voluntary tax compliance). We did this because 
procedural justice and trust both overlap somewhat with the perceived competence of the 
tax authority in collecting taxes (e.g. by increasing perceived detection probability; see 
Gangl et al., 2015; Gangl et al., 2012; Kirchler et al., 2008; Weiner et al., 1997). Perceptions 
of competence can be associated with higher levels of enforced tax compliance (Devos, 
2014; Hartl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014). However, our argument about the role of 
identification with the nation in moderating the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction 
assumes that identification makes individuals voluntarily contribute to the collective, 
regardless of the cost for themselves. Therefore, finding that the hypothesized three-way 
interaction between procedural justice, trust in the tax authority, and identification predicts 
voluntary, rather than enforced, tax compliance will boost our confidence in the conclusions 
that we draw.  
3.4 Method  
3.4.1 Respondents and Procedure 
We determined the appropriate size of our samples with power analysis using the G*Power 
(Faul et al., 2009). Power analysis is used to calculate the minimum sample size required so 
that one is reasonably likely to detect an effect of a given size (Abraham & Russell, 2008). 
Interaction effects are usually small in size in survey designs (in terms of Cohen’s (1988) 
rules of thumb, f2 = .03-.04; Aguinis et al., 2005; Shieh, 2010). With a desired power of .80 
(i.e. an 80% probability of detecting a true effect with effect size of .035), β = .20, and α = 
.05 (i.e. a 5% chance of incorrectly concluding an effect exists in the population when it does 
not), power analysis yielded a minimum sample size of 179. Our sample sizes (N = 217 for 
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the Ethiopian sample and N = 200 for the US) are thus appropriate to draw reliable 
conclusions. 
In the Ethiopian Civil Service University, Tilburg University, and Erasmus 
University, with which we are affiliated, a researcher is not required to obtain ethics approval 
for data collection using surveys for which responding is highly unlikely to affect the 
psychological or physical well-being of respondents. Furthermore, filling in our survey was 
based on voluntary participation, indicated in a letter accompanying the questionnaire 
(Ethiopian sample) or communicated in the recruitment message (US sample), and hence we 
did not seek ethics approval. 
The first sample consisted of 217 working professionals (i.e. taxpayers who were 
engaged primarily in business consulting activities with accounting, economics, 
management, and engineering backgrounds; some engaged in tertiary-level teaching; and 
only a few with a lower level of academics working as clerks and secretaries) in the 
Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. We administered a questionnaire prepared in English. Of 
the respondents, 83.6% were male, 14.2% were female, and 2.2% did not indicate their gender. 
Respondents were between 20 and 60 years of age (Mage = 36.3, SDage = 8.04). With regard to 
the highest level of education, 0.5% had completed elementary education only, 4.1% had a 2-
year college diploma, 20.1% had a bachelor’s degree, 60.3% had completed a master’s degree, 
11.9% had completed a PhD, and 3.1% did not indicate their highest level of education. With 
respect to their annual earnings, 7.1% of the respondents reported that they had annual 
earnings of 20,000–40,000 Ethiopian Birr (1 Birr = approximately USD .05), 11.8% had 
earned 40,000–60,000 Birr, 16.6% had earned 60,000–80,000 Birr, 29.9% had earned 
80,000–100,000 Birr, 10.9% had earned 100,000–120,000 Birr, and 23.7% had earned more 
than 120,000 Birr. Among the respondents, 3.3% reported that they had less than 2 years of 
experience with the tax authority, 12.6% had 2–6 years, 25.1% had 6–10 years, 36.7% had 
10–20 years, and 22.3% had more than 20 years of experience. In terms of ethnicity, 32% of 
the respondents described themselves as Oromo, 21.9% as Amhara, 14.2% as Tigray, 5.9% as 
Gurage, 10.5% as “other,” and 15.5% did not report their ethnic background. The ethnic 
composition of the Ethiopian respondents within the total number of respondents in this 
sample roughly mirrors the ethnic groups’ composition in the Ethiopian population; that is, 
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34.4% Oromos, 27% Amharas, 6.1% Tgrians, 2.5% Gurage, and 30% other. The “other” 
30% comprises the remaining 76 ethnic groups. We coded income range of respondents as 1 
= 20,000-40,000 Birr, 2 = 40,000-60,000 Birr, 3 = 60,000-80,000 Birr, 4 = 80,000-100,00 Birr, 
5 = 100,000-120,000 Birr, and 6 = more than 120,000 Birr; years of experience with the tax 
authority as 1 = less than 2 years, 2 = 2-6 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4 = 10-20 years, and 5 = more 
than 20 years; highest level of education attained as 1 = completed elementary school, 2 = 
completed high school, 3 = completed college diploma, 4 = completed first degree, 5 = 
completed master’s degree, and 6 = completed a PhD; ethnicity as 1 = Amhara, 2 = Tigray, 3 
= Oromo, 4 = Gurage, and 5 = Other. 
For the Ethiopian sample, we used a printed questionnaire to collect the data. We 
collected the data over a period of three months, February-April, 2015. We distributed a total 
of 300 questionnaires to working professionals. Accompanying the questionnaire was a cover 
letter and a pre-paid reply envelope for enclosure of the filled-out questionnaire. The cover 
letter explained the intent of the study and guaranteed strict confidentiality of responses. Two 
hundred and twenty-three questionnaires were returned (a response rate of 74%). Of these, six 
respondents skipped a significant number of questions and were therefore removed from the 
dataset. Accordingly, a total of 217 usable questionnaires were included in the analysis.  
The US sample consisted of 200 US income taxpayers. Respondents were invited 
online to participate in the study. All respondents responded to all questions, and hence there 
were no dropouts or missing values. We introduced the study as being about “how and why 
people decide to voluntarily comply with taxation or evade it.” Of the 200 respondents, 56.5% 
were male and 43.5% were female. Respondents were between 19 and 75 years of age (Mage = 
37.90, SDage = 12.34). In terms of their highest level of education, 0.5% had completed 
elementary school only, 18% had a high school diploma, 19% had completed vocational 
education, 50% had a bachelor’s degree, 10.5% had completed a master’s degree, and 2% had 
completed a PhD. With respect to their annual earnings, 20.3% of the respondents reported 
having annual earnings less than 20,000 USD, 41.8% had earned 20,000–40,000 USD, 
15.9% had earned 40,000–60,000 USD, 13% had earned 60,000–80,000 USD, 5.6% had 
earned 80,000–100,000 USD, and 3.4% had earned more than 100,000 USD. Among the 
respondents, 4% reported that they had less than 2 years of experience with the tax authority, 
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17.5% had 2–6 years, 13.5% had 6–10 years, 33% had 10–20 years, and 32% had more than 
20 years of experience. Regarding ethnic background, 79.5% of respondents identified 
themselves as White/Caucasian, 3% as Hispanic American, 10% as African American, 5.5% 
as Asian American, 0.5% as Native American, and 1.5% as “other” than those listed. Like in 
the Ethiopian sample, we coded income range of respondents as 1 = less than 20,000 USD, 2 
= 20,000-40,000 USD, 3 = 40,000-60,000 USD, 4 = 60,000-80,000 USD, 5 = 80,000-100,00 
USD, 6 = more than 100,000 USD; years of experience with the tax authority as 1 = less than 
2 years, 2 = 2-6 years, 3 = 6-10 years, 4 = 10-20 years, and 5 = more than 20 years; highest 
level of education attained as 1 = completed elementary school, 2 = completed high school 
diploma, 3 = completed vocational education, 4 = completed bachelor’s degree, 5 = completed 
master’s, and 6 = completed a PhD; ethnicity as 1 = White/Caucasian, 2 = Hispanic American, 
3 = African American, 4 = Asian American, and 5 = Native American, and 6 = Other. 
For the US sample, we recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
over a period of one week in May (13-21), 2015. AMT is an online community designed to 
bring researchers in contact with respondents who are willing to participate in research. 
AMT has become a popular platform for collecting data across the social sciences (Berinsky 
et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012). For instance, studies have used AMT to address issues as 
diverse as generosity (Cryder et al., 2013), cross-cultural variations in work outcomes 
(Uhlmann et al., 2013), and procedural justice enactment (van Houwelingen et al., 2014). 
Studies evaluating the validity of AMT have shown that the data obtained are reasonably 
reliable (Behrend, Sharek, & Meade, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci 
& Chandler, 2014), while representativeness of such samples requires close scrutiny by 
recruiters (see Goodman & Paolacci, 2017). We return to this in the general discussion. 
3.4.2 Measures 
We used scales developed for developed countries to collect data in a developed (i.e. the US) 
and a developing county (i.e. Ethiopia). We did this because the scales are not specific to the 
context of developed countries; they have been utilized across cultures before; and most 
importantly, this makes comparison of results for developing and developed countries sensible. 
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We measured procedural justice with a 7-item scale5 developed and validated by 
Colquitt (2001). We used this scale rather than scales that have been used before in the tax 
compliance literature because these scales include items that do not refer to aspects of decision-
making procedures, and they overlap with other constructs. For instance, Murphy’s (2004) 
measure of procedural justice of the tax authority contains items that measure trust. An 
example item that overlaps with trust is “The tax office treats people as if they can be trusted 
to do the right thing.” The Colquitt (2001) measure, on the other hand, is solely based on 
Leventhal’s (1980) and Thibaut & Walker's (1975) concept of procedural justice and 
measures the most common procedural justice criteria: voice, bias suppression, accuracy, 
consistency, and norm adherence. Therefore, we argue that this measure is an improvement 
over existing procedural justice measures in the tax compliance literature. We slightly 
adapted the Colquitt (2001) items to fit the context of procedural justice of the tax authority. 
Item examples (preceded by the stem “The following items refer to the procedures used to 
arrive at tax-related decisions.”) are “I have been able to express my views and feelings 
during those procedures” and “Those procedures have been free of bias” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged these items into a procedural justice scale. The 
                                                          
5 Items 2 and 6 from the Colquitt (2001) measure refer to “outcomes” of the authority’s 
decision. We assumed that respondents in both samples would understand what such 
outcomes can be (e.g. individual taxpayers winning a tax refund claim, adjustments made 
to tax rates, or selection of taxpayers for tax audit). The Ethiopian sample consisted of 
business owners who likely had experience in interacting with the tax authority. The US 
respondents would have also had experience in interacting with the tax authority, as the 
United States federal and state income tax systems are self-assessment systems requiring 
that taxpayers must declare, file, and pay taxes without assessment by the taxing authority; 
the relevant tax authority later decides on which taxpayers to audit (see Roach, 2010). 
Analyses showed that in both samples the Procedural Justice × Trust and Trust × 
Identification was similar in shape and significance regardless of whether the two items 
containing a reference to “decision outcomes” were included or not. 
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complete adapted scale is found in Appendix A. 
Following Gobena and Van Dijke (2016; see also Gangl et al., 2015; Gangl et al., 
2012), we measured trust with the 6-item cognition-based trust scale developed by 
McAllister (1995). We used this scale rather than other scales that have been used before in 
the tax compliance literature because these scales include items that overlap with items of 
procedural justice of the tax authority. Murphy’s (2004) measure of institutional trust in the 
tax authority, for instance, contains items that measure the fairness of the tax authority’s 
decision-making procedures. We slightly adapted the McAllister (1995) items to fit the 
context of cognition-based trust in the tax authority. Item examples are “The tax officials 
approach their job with professionalism and dedication” and “Given these officials’ track 
record, I see no reason to doubt their competence and preparation for their job” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items into one scale. The complete scale is 
found in Appendix A of Gobena and Van Dijke (2016). 
We measured voluntary tax compliance with a 10-item scale from Gobena and Van 
Dijke (2016) adapted from Kirchler and Wahl (2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem 
“When I pay my taxes as required by the [Ethiopian/US] tax laws and regulations, I do so...”) 
are “…because I pay my taxes voluntarily” and “…without spending a long time thinking 
how I could reduce them” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items 
to create a voluntary compliance index. The complete scale is found in Appendix A of Gobena 
and Van Dijke (2016). 
We measured enforced tax compliance with an 8-item scale from Gobena and Van 
Dijke (2016) adapted from Kirchler and Wahl (2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem 
“When I pay my taxes as required by the [Ethiopian/US] tax laws and regulations, I do so…”) 
are “…because I feel forced to pay my taxes” and “…because a great many tax audits are 
carried out” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  We averaged the items to create 
an enforced tax compliance index. The complete scale is found in Appendix A of Gobena and 
Van Dijke (2016). 
We measured identification with the nation with a 10-item scale from Tyler and Blader 
(2001). We slightly adapted the items to fit the current context. Item examples are “My nation 
is important to the way I think of myself as a person” and “When someone praises the 
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accomplishments of my nation, it feels like a personal compliment to me” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items to create an identification index. The 
complete scale is found in Appendix A. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 present means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha coefficients, 
and correlations between the variables in the Ethiopian and US samples, respectively.  
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As can be seen in Table 3.1 and 3.2, in both samples, in line with prior work, all 
predictor variables, namely procedural justice (e.g. Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010; Wenzel, 
2002), trust in the tax authority (e.g. Gobena & Van Dijke, 2016; Scholz & Lubell, 1998; 
Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010), and identification with the nation (e.g. Wenzel, 2002), had 
significant positive associations with voluntary tax compliance. Also in line with prior work, 
none of these variables were significantly associated with enforced tax compliance (Gobena 
& Van Dijke, 2016), apart from trust in the US sample. This latter correlation is, in fact, in 
line with the slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008), which 
assumes that trust in and power of the tax authority are critical dimensions in understanding 
tax compliance. Specifically, while power of the tax authority elicits enforced compliance, 
trust in the authority leads to voluntary compliance (see Kirchler, 2007). The framework 
argues that if taxpayers' perception of the potential of tax officials to detect and punish tax 
evasions is interpreted as coercive (vs. legitimate) power, the level of enforced tax 
compliance increases, but the same interpretation damages trust in the tax authority. 
Consequently, trust in the tax authority and enforced tax compliance are argued to be 
negatively correlated.  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show that trust, procedural justice, and identification are 
intercorrelated (as they were in all prior field studies that included trust or identification as 
moderator of procedural justice effects; e.g. see De Cremer & Tyler, 2007; Van Dijke & 
Verboon, 2010 for procedural justice and trust correlation; Wenzel, 2002; De Cremer, 2005 
for procedural justice and identification correlation). However, these correlations are clearly 
lower than the threshold (i.e. .8 or .9) where multicollinearity issues can arise in the analyses 
that we used to test our hypothesis, that is regression analyses (see Mela, 2002; Tu et al., 
2005). 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show that the US sample scored higher than the Ethiopian 
sample on voluntary tax compliance (4.95 vs. 4.51; t(199) = 3.52, p < .01), procedural justice 
(3.71 vs. 2.95; t(198) = -6.18, p < .01), and trust (3.74 vs. 3.17; t(198) = -4.53, p < .01). The 
higher scores on these variables are in line with the difference in the tax environments 
between these countries, with the Ethiopian tax environment, as noted earlier, sometimes 
being referred to as a “cops and robbers” type (see Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena & Van Dijke, 
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2016). Identification was higher for the Ethiopian sample than the US sample (4.86 vs. 4.49; 
t(198) = 2.50, p = .01). This may reflect nationalism that has served to transcend political, 
social, economic, and cultural challenges in Ethiopia, which is argued to have resulted from 
Ethiopian nationalists’ continual attempts to harness national cohesion against threats from 
both within and outside of Ethiopia (see Gebrewold, 2009). 
3.5.2 Regression Analyses  
Because our research question pertains to establishing boundary conditions to known effects, 
we used moderated regression (Dawson & Richter, 2006; Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Rosnow 
& Rosenthal, 1995). We used this approach (i.e. the three-way analysis) rather than other 
options (e.g. splitting the sample at the mean of various variables and ANOVA) that are 
clearly suboptimal as they lead to loss of a lot of information (see Irwin & McClelland, 2003; 
Royston et al., 2006). Unlike the vast majority of studies in the tax compliance literature that 
used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (e.g. Murphy, 2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; 
Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010), we used linear regression with robust standard errors. Robust 
standard errors help overcome the limitations of OLS6 regression that it is very sensitive to 
the presence of outliers and that it can easily inflate the standard errors of the slope 
coefficients when the criterion variable contains measurement error (see Adedia et al., 2016; 
Alma, 2011). 
                                                          
6 We conducted OLS regression analyses in addition to the robust regression results reported in this chapter. We 
did this to see if our results differ when OLS regression is used. We opted to not report OLS regression results in 
the main text because OLS regression is sensitive to the presence of outliers. Besides, when the criterion variable 
contains errors (such as those occurring when it is measured with self-report scales), the standard errors of the 
slope coefficients become inflated (although the estimation of the slopes is unbiased) when OLS regression is 
used. The OLS regression revealed results that were almost identical to the results presented in the main text. 
There were two differences. First, short of supporting our hypothesis, in the Ethiopian sample, the simple slope 
for the effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance when identification was low (1 SD below the mean) 
and trust was also low (1 SD below the mean) was not significant (β = .20, t = .91, p = .36). Second, contrary to 
the result in linear regression with robust standard errors and in support of our hypothesis, in the Ethiopian 
sample, the simple slope for the effect of procedural justice on compliance when identification was low (1 SD 
below the mean) and trust was high (1 SD above the mean) was not significant (β = -.28, t = -1.60, p = .11).  
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 Demographic variables did not significantly correlate with the predictor variables 
except business years with procedural justice and trust in the US sample. Therefore, we 
decided to not include them as controls in the regression analyses (Carlson & Wu, 2012).  
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Table 3.3 presents the results of the regression analyses. As Table 3.3 shows, the R2 
of the regression result is higher in the US than in the Ethiopian sample for step 1 of the 
regression. This likely occurs because trust has stronger main effect in the US sample in step 
1 (and subsequent steps, of course) than in the Ethiopian sample. This difference could be 
caused by the difference in the tax environments – specifically, the Ethiopian respondents 
evaluating their relationship with the tax authority as antagonistic, which leads to lowered 
value of trust in the tax authority (see Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena & Van Dijke, 2016). 
However, for steps 2 and 3, R2 changes are similar for both samples. Importantly, the 
interaction of theoretical interest that we focused on in this paper is comparable across the 
two samples. 
In step 1, in both the Ethiopian and the US sample, identification predicted voluntary 
tax compliance significantly, while procedural justice did not. In this step, trust predicted 
voluntary tax compliance only in the US sample. In step 2, the same main effect patterns as 
in step 1 prevailed in both samples. Furthermore, in both samples, while the Procedural 
Justice × Identification interaction predicted voluntary tax compliance, the Procedural 
Justice × Trust interaction did not. The Trust × Identification interaction predicted voluntary 
tax compliance in the US sample, but not in the Ethiopian sample in step 2. We note that the 
sign of the Procedural Justice × Identification interaction was positive in the Ethiopian 
sample and negative in the US sample. Thus, in the Ethiopian sample, procedural justice is 
more strongly related to voluntary tax compliance among high (rather than low) identifiers; 
in the US sample, procedural justice is more strongly related to tax compliance among low 
(rather than high) identifiers. 
This difference may result from the difference in the tax climates from which the 
respondents were drawn. As noted, the Ethiopian tax climate is a typical “cops and robbers” 
type whereby the tax authority and the taxpayers work against each other (see Abdella & 
Clifford, 2010; Gobena & van Dijke, 2016). In such an environment, justice may make sense 
only among those who strongly identify with the nation; weakly identifying citizens may 
consider all authorities’ decisions and procedures in a negative light (Lipponen, Wisse, & 
Perälä, 2011; Wenzel, 2002). On the other hand, in the more cooperative environment of the 
“client and service” tax climate in the US, high identifiers may not be as concerned about 
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the fairness of authorities as low identifiers because high identifiers perceive authorities’ 
actions in a positive light regardless of their actions; low identifiers attend to procedural 
justice information to avoid abuse of power by the authorities (see Huo, Smith, Tyler, & 
Lind, 1996). 
In step 3, the main effects of procedural justice, trust, and identification were similar 
to those in step 2. Furthermore, the Procedural Justice × Trust and Procedural Justice × 
Identification interactions did not predict voluntary tax compliance in both samples, whereas 
the Trust × Identification interaction continued to predict voluntary compliance only in the 
US sample. However, as predicted, the Procedural Justice × Trust × Identification interaction 
predicted voluntary tax compliance in both samples. Figure 1 visually presents the shape of 
this interaction for the Ethiopian sample; Figure 2 presents the shape of this interaction for 
the US sample. 
Because the variables were each measured on a 7-point scale, we treated the data as 
continuous and applied parametric tests without using dummy variables. In creating the 
categories in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, we used the Excel facility provided by Dawson (2014) that 
automatically yields coefficients used in plotting the interaction graphs. For this plotting, the 
criterion was always 1 SD below/above the mean. 
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Figure 3.2. The Significant Procedural Justice × Trust Interaction on Tax Compliance When 
Identification with the Nation is Low (Upper Panel) and the Non-Significant Procedural 
Justice × Trust Interaction on Tax Compliance When Identification with the Nation is High 
(Lower Panel) (Ethiopian Sample) 
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Figure 3.3. The Significant Procedural Justice × Trust Interaction on Tax Compliance When 
Identification with the Nation is Low (Upper Panel) and the Non-Significant Procedural 
Justice × Trust Interaction on Tax Compliance When Identification with the Nation is High 
(Lower Panel) (US Sample) 
We proceeded to test our hypothesis with simple slopes analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991). Simple slopes analysis is a follow-up analysis that shows whether a specific effect 
(i.e. the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction, and the main effect of procedural justice) is 
significantly different from zero as a function of the moderator value, something that 
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moderated regression itself cannot tell (see Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson & Richter, 2006; 
Robinson et al., 2013). In support of our hypothesis, this analysis showed that the Procedural 
Justice × Trust interaction significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance when 
identification was low (1 SD below the mean) in the Ethiopian sample (β = -.20, t = -2.00, p 
= .04) and the US sample (β = -.22, t = -2.00, p = .04). However, when identification was 
high (1 SD above the mean), the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction did not significantly 
predict voluntary compliance in the Ethiopian sample (β = .04, t = .46, p = .65) or the US 
sample (β = .03, t = .45, p = .65). Thus, among citizens who weakly identify with the nation, 
the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance varied 
significantly as a function of their level of trust in the authority. However, for citizens who 
strongly identify with the nation, the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary 
tax compliance did not significantly vary as a function of their level of trust in the tax 
authority.  
 We proceeded with further simple slopes tests to decompose the simple Procedural 
Justice × Trust interaction among low and high identifiers. In line with our argument, for the 
Ethiopian sample, the results of this analysis showed that when identification was low (1 SD 
below the mean) and trust was low (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between 
procedural justice and compliance was positive and significant (β = .31, t = 2.01, p = .04). 
When identification was low (1 SD below the mean) and trust was high (1 SD above the 
mean), the relationship between procedural justice and compliance was significant and 
negative (β = -.28, t = -2.50, p = .01). A potential explanation for this unpredicted 
relationship could be the “cops and robbers” climate that the Ethiopian respondents have 
become used to. These respondents may value a match between the actions of the tax 
authority represented by low procedural justice and their experience with the authority. This 
perceived match (while trust is high, suggesting respondents believe they will not be taken 
advantage of) may have resulted in positive responses to low (compared to high) procedural 
justice. However, this is speculation and we leave open the possibility that this specific 
simple relationship between low (vs. high) procedural justice and high tax compliance is a 
statistical fluke, as it did not also replicate in the US sample (see below).   
In the US sample, when identification was low and trust was low (1 SD below the 
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mean), the relationship between procedural justice and compliance was positive and 
significant (β = .45, t = 2.72, p = .01). When identification was low (1 SD below the mean) 
and trust was high (1 SD above the mean), the relationship between procedural justice and 
compliance was not significant (β = -.01, t = -.02, p = .98). 
Although at high levels of identification the simple slopes of the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary compliance did not significantly differ as a function of the 
level of trust, we nevertheless conducted simple slopes analyses to test if, among highly 
identifying citizens, the simple slopes may be significantly different from 0. In the Ethiopian 
sample, these analyses showed that, when identification was high, procedural justice did not 
predict voluntary tax compliance at both low (β = .21, t = .93, p = .36) and high (β = .26, t = 
1.61, p = .11) levels of trust. Similarly, in the US sample, when identification was high, 
procedural justice did not predict voluntary compliance regardless of whether trust was low 
(β = -.11, t = -.74, p = .46) or high (β = -.04, t = -.23, p = .82).  
Table 3.4 (see Appendix B) shows that trust was significantly and negatively 
associated with enforced tax compliance in the US but not the Ethiopian sample. 
Furthermore, the three-way interaction that we predicted for voluntary tax compliance was 
not significant with enforced tax compliance as a criterion variable in both samples. This 
boosts our confidence in our specific argument that addresses fear of exploitation and 
identification and subsequent goal internalization as precursors of voluntary tax compliance. 
We also note that the sample of origin (Ethiopia vs. US) did not moderate our results7. 
3.6 General Discussion 
We showed that procedural justice of the tax authority is positively related to voluntary tax 
compliance particularly among citizens with low (vs. high) trust in this authority. However, 
this Procedural Justice × Trust interaction was limited to citizens who weakly (vs. strongly) 
identify with their country. More specifically, high (vs. low) procedural justice predicts 
                                                          
7 To test whether any of the results differed significantly between the two samples, we combined the two datasets 
and tested if sample of origin (i.e. Ethiopian vs. US sample) moderated any of the main effects, simple 
interactions, or the three-way interaction of procedural justice, trust, and identification. We found no evidence 
that the sample moderates any of these effects. 
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increased voluntary compliance only when identification is low and trust is simultaneously 
low. We obtained this effect in two samples, one of income taxpayers in a developing country 
(Ethiopia) and one of income taxpayers in a developed country (the US). In line with our 
expectations, we found no interactive effect of procedural justice, trust, and identification on 
enforced tax compliance. In the following sections we discuss the implications and limitations 
of these findings.  
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
Procedural justice is one of the most often studied and most established antecedents of 
voluntary compliance with the tax authority (e.g. Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & Commissioners, 
2009; Hartner et al., 2008).  However, as noted, prior studies have not always revealed 
consistent results. Some studies showed that high procedural justice is positively related to 
voluntary tax compliance (e.g. Alm et al., 1993; Farrar, 2015; Hogan et al., 2012; Murphy, 
2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). But other studies did not consistently show such a 
relationship (e.g. Porcano, 1988; Wenzel, 2002; Worsham, 1996). By identifying boundary 
conditions to the effect of procedural justice on voluntary compliance, we increase our 
understanding of when procedural justice can be expected to promote voluntary compliance 
and when this cannot be expected. Our research thus also suggests why prior research 
sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed in revealing a significant relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance. Of course, the inconsistency in prior 
findings might also be (partly) attributable to the way procedural justice of the tax authority 
was operationalized, as we highlighted in the measures part of our study. 
Second, prior work has identified trust in the tax authority and identification with 
the nation as factors that explain why procedural justice leads to voluntary tax compliance. 
However, until now, no work has considered how trust and identification processes may 
relate to each other. By including both variables as moderators of the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary compliance, the present research reveals how these two 
processes interrelate. Individuals respond positively (i.e. with increased tax compliance) to 
high procedural justice when they have low (vs. high) trust in the tax authority. In other 
words, low trust makes individuals focus on procedural justice information to assess whether 
68 
 
 
they want to contribute to the collective. However, strong identification with the nation 
overrides these concerns, as identification implies that one internalizes collective goals, thus 
making one care less about one’s own personal outcomes. Our research thus suggests that 
the processes described in fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) are fundamentally self-
focused in nature; they disappear under strong identification with the nation. 
By being the first to test a tax compliance hypothesis in a developing as well as a 
developed nation, our research also contributes to the tax compliance literature more 
broadly. One important limitation of the extant literature is that little research has explored 
tax compliance in developing countries, in contrast to the extensive studies conducted in 
Western nations (see Doyle, Frecknall-Hughes, & Summers, 2009; Saad, 2011; Torgler & 
Schneider, 2007). Because of this scarcity of tax compliance studies in developing countries 
(for exceptions, see Abdul–Razak & Adafula, 2013; Alabede et al., 2011; Gobena & Van 
Dijke, 2016; Smulders & Naidoo, 2013), there is virtually no comparison of results across 
cultures. Yet, as noted, the tax environment in many developing countries differs in 
important ways from that in Europe and the US, as in developing countries (more than in 
developed nations), taxpayers usually do not view paying taxes as a contribution to the 
buildup and maintenance of common public goods (Asaminew, 2010; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 
2001; Gangl et al., 2014). Of course, taxpayers’ determination to evade taxes in developing 
countries seems to reciprocate the actions of tax authorities, who often show little trust in 
taxpayers as reasonable citizens and seem to believe that coercion can solve all problems 
related to tax (non-) compliance, contrary to the relations in developed countries. This is also 
illustrated in our research, in which we found that the level of trust of taxpayers in tax 
authorities, the level of perceived procedural justice, and the level of voluntary compliance 
are higher in the US than in Ethiopia. Our tests of the hypothesis in two samples that are 
very divergent in terms of their tax environments and tax morale clearly contribute to the 
confidence that we can have in these findings and, more generally, contribute to our 
confidence in the social psychological approach to stimulate voluntary tax compliance 
across the world. 
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3.6.2 Practical Implications 
We contribute to the practice of tax administration in two ways. First, the most important policy 
alternatives to deal with self-focused taxpayers who weakly identify with the nation are for the 
tax authority to either work in a way that it would be perceived by those taxpayers as being 
high in procedural justice or to be sufficiently coercive as to deter tax evasion. This last 
alternative is being followed by most authorities in developing countries, who have not worked 
hard to build mutual trust with their citizens (Bekana et al., 2014; Fjeldstad, 2001). However, 
it is a costly approach (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Alm, Kirchler, Muehlbacher, 
Gangl, Hofmann, Kogler, & Pollai, 2012; Gangl et al., 2015; Murphy & Tyler, 2008) that likely 
drains the meager tax money that authorities in these countries collect. Our findings highlight 
that procedural justice is particularly important in order to foster voluntary tax compliance for 
authorities who are not trusted by citizens who weakly identify with their nation.  
Second, we contribute to the manner in which tax authorities may have to administer 
taxation in order to initiate and sustain a high level of voluntary compliance with taxation 
through an interaction between procedural justice, trust, and identification with the nation. We 
found that identification with the nation, in its own right, significantly predicts voluntary tax 
compliance in both samples. This implies that individuals internalize the values and norms of 
the group with which they identify and voluntarily cooperate with the authorities that represent 
the group. Therefore, it is important to work on policies and procedures that beget citizens’ 
identification with the nation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; van den Bos et al., 1996). 
3.6.3 Limitations 
Our study is not without limitations. A first limitation results from the cross-sectional nature 
of our study, which does not allow drawing causal conclusions. Future studies should clarify 
the causal links between the study variables using experimental or longitudinal designs. Yet 
it should be noted that prior experimental studies (e.g. Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & 
Commissioners, 2009; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010), including field experiments (Wenzel, 
2006), provided causal support for the effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance. Future research should address the causal roles of trust in authorities and 
identification with the nation in experimental settings, for instance, using bogus pipeline 
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procedures (e.g. Doosje et al., 1995; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010).   
A second limitation is that our nonrandom sampling technique in both studies likely 
hampered the representativeness of our respondents for the populations from which they 
were drawn. The use of AMT is particularly criticized on the ground that the sample 
recruited does not represent the US population (see Goodman and Paolacci, 2017). 
Nevertheless, since our intent is testing theory rather than generalizing the finding to a 
specific population, the use of nonrandom samples does not limit our conclusions. This is 
because while testing theory, all measures are indirect indicators of theoretical constructs, 
and no methodological procedures taken alone can produce external validity (see Lucas, 
2003). We also argue that our studies are high in ecological validity (see Leary, 2012) 
relative to prior field studies, which were conducted almost solely in Western countries. That 
is because the dissimilarity of the two samples provides strength to the conclusions we draw, 
as replication of results over distinct nonrandom samples implies dependability of the 
results. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
Procedural justice is one of the most useful and practical tools that have been identified by 
social-psychological research to stimulate voluntary tax compliance. The present research 
helps us to understand why this effect is not always found, what the processes are that 
underlie this effect, and how general the effect is across different taxation climates. 
Investigating interactions between established antecedents of voluntary tax compliance can 
thus result in theoretical progress as well as practically useful results that are applicable in 
both developing and developed nations. 
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Appendix A 
Below is a list of two of the measures used in this paper. All responses were on a Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = moderately disagree, 4 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Procedural Justice (Colquitt, 2001) 
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-related decisions. 
1. I have been able to express my views and feelings during those procedures. 
2. I have had influence over the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
3. Those procedures have been applied consistently. 
4. Those procedures have been free of bias. 
5. Those procedures have been based on accurate information. 
6. I have been able to appeal the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
7. Those procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards. 
Identification with the Nation (Tyler & Blader, 2001) 
1. My nation is important to the way I think of myself as a person.  
2. When someone praises the accomplishments of my nation, it feels like a personal 
compliment to me.  
3. When I talk about my nation I usually say “we” rather than “they.”  
4. I feel a sense that I personally belong to Ethiopia/the US.  
5. I feel that the problems of my nation are my own personal problems.  
6. When someone from outside criticizes my nation, it feels like a personal insult.  
7. I feel like a valued member of my nation.  
8. When something goes wrong in my nation, I feel a personal responsibility to fix it.  
9. My nation says a lot about who I am as a person.  
10. I do not feel like an important part of my nation (reverse coded). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 DOES LEGITIMACY MATTER? A THREE-
WAY INTERACTION BETWEEN 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE, AND LEGITIMATE POWER ON 
VOLUNTARY TAX COMPLIANCE8   
                                                          
8 Gobena, L. B., Verboon, P., & Van Dijke, M. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Complying with tax laws and regulations involves an ethical dilemma where the personal 
gains that result from non-compliance come at a cost for society and its individual, 
impersonal members (Chung and Trivedi, 2003; Dowling, 2014; Gangl et al., 2015; Kaplan 
et al., 1997; Maciejovsky, et al., 2012; McGee, 2006; Molero and Pujol, 2012). This dilemma 
facing taxpayers has captured the attention of scholars from various disciplines for at least 
half a century (see Kirchler, 2007 for an overview). As part of scientific investigation into 
tax compliance, social psychologists have identified various factors that predict voluntary 
compliance with taxation laws and regulations (i.e. voluntary tax compliance). Two of the 
most important antecedents of voluntary tax compliance that research has identified are the 
distributive justice of the tax authority (e.g. Cowell, 1992; Saad, 2011; Wenzel, 2002, 2003) 
and the procedural justice of this authority (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008).  
Surprisingly, tax compliance researchers have so far not considered if (and when) 
these two justice dimensions may interact to predict tax compliance. This is despite 
extensive investigation of the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction effect on 
responses to authorities and social systems (e.g. on organizational commitment; Brockner et 
al., 1994; and trust in the authority; Brockner et al., 1995) in social and applied psychology 
(e.g. see Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996 for an overview). Specifically, the interactive effect 
of procedural and distributive justice on responses to authorities and the social collectives 
that they represent has often been shown to take a form in which high procedural justice or 
high distributive justice is sufficient to lead to positive responses to the authority. Put 
differently, less positive responses result only when procedural justice and distributive 
justice are both low. 
The lack of understanding of how (and when) procedural and distributive justice 
interact in shaping tax compliance is unfortunate for theoretical and practical reasons. 
Theoretically, without understanding how and when these justice variables interact, it is 
difficult to fully understand why these justice dimensions shape tax compliance in the first 
place. And practically, distributive justice is often perceived as low by taxpayers, for various 
reasons (Alm et al., 1993; Bobek et al., 2007; Saad, 2011; Trivedi et al., 2003). Taxpayers 
may, for instance, view their exchange with the government as unfair (i.e. they feel that they 
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are not enjoying the benefits of tax-funded public goods and services as much as they think 
they deserve); or they may view that they are paying too much in taxes, but benefiting less 
in terms of the returns on their tax money compared with other taxpayers (see Alm et al., 
1993; Alon and Hageman, 2013; Dowling, 2014; Fjeldstad et al., 2012; Wenzel, 2003). High 
(vs. low) procedural justice may thus counteract or buffer the undermining effect of low (vs. 
high) distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance.   
In the present article, we test the process that may underlie the interaction between 
procedural and distributive justice in predicting voluntary tax compliance by considering a 
boundary condition to this effect that is highly relevant from an ethical as well as a tax 
compliance perspective. Specifically, drawing on a sense-making analysis of justice 
(Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer et al., 2010), we will argue that the Procedural 
Justice × Distributive Justice interaction predicts voluntary compliance in particular with tax 
authorities who are perceived to be high (rather than low) in legitimate power. Legitimate 
power of the tax authority is a relevant boundary condition to consider because changes 
along the continuum of legitimacy of the (tax) authority affects whether individual taxpayers 
care about justice enacted by the authority (Fields, Pang, and Chiu, 2000; Kirchler et al., 
2008; Tyler, 1997; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). This holds presumably because citizens want to 
make sense of the manner in which the (tax) authority exercises its power before they judge 
the authority as just to consequently decide to cooperate or not (Hechter, 2009; Tyler & 
Fagan, 2008; Tyler et al., 2010). Accordingly, we test a three-way interaction between 
distributive justice of the tax authority, procedural justice of the authority, and legitimate 
power of the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance. We test this proposed interaction 
using two samples of taxpayers—an Ethiopian sample and a US sample. 
This research makes two contributions to the literature. First, the interaction between 
procedural and distributive justice has been shortlisted as a highly relevant conceptual and 
empirical contribution to the justice literature (Colquitt et al., 2005). However, 
notwithstanding its obvious relevance resulting from the fact that so many taxpayers 
perceive distributive justice of taxation to be low, it has not been considered in a tax 
compliance context. We introduce this interaction to the tax compliance literature and also 
identify a theoretically and practically relevant boundary condition—legitimate power 
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wielded by the tax authority—to its effectiveness in predicting voluntary tax compliance. 
This boundary condition is a novel addition to the literature, even beyond the tax compliance 
context. Second, almost all tax compliance studies have been conducted in developed nations 
(i.e. Europe, Australia, and the United States), with developing countries being neglected. 
Yet, tax environments in developing countries differ from those in Europe and the US. 
Taxation environments in developing countries are often characterized as so-called ‘‘cops 
and robbers” relationships between taxpayers and the tax authority, in which taxpayers view 
taxation as a burden, rather than a contribution to a common good, and authorities show little 
trust in taxpayers (Abdella and Clifford, 2010; Asaminew, 2010; Gobena and Van Dijke, 
2016; Kirchler et al., 2008). In developed countries, relations between taxpayers and tax 
authorities are often more harmonious (see Alm and Torgler, 2011; Alon and Hageman, 
2013; Bobek et al., 2013; Hansen et al., 1992; Hume et al., 1999; Maciejovsky et al., 2012; 
McGee, 2006; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Trivedi et al., 2003). We contribute to the ecological 
validity of the tax compliance literature by testing our predictions in both a developing and 
a developed nation (i.e. Ethiopia and the US).     
4.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis 
4.2.1 Distributive Justice, Procedural Justice and Voluntary Tax Compliance 
Distributive justice refers to the extent to which outcomes of a process that distributes 
rewards and burdens are perceived as matching implicit norms such as the equity rule 
(Adams, 1965; Thibaut and Walker, 1975; Verboon and Van Dijke, 2007). The equity rule 
requires that individuals should receive benefits proportional to their contributions. Research 
has shown that individuals react more positively when decision outcomes are perceived as 
fair, rather than unfair (e.g. Bianchi et al., 2015; Brockner, 2002; Leventhal, 1976).  More 
specific to the tax compliance literature, studies have shown that individuals voluntarily 
comply with tax laws when they perceive the distribution of tax burdens and benefits across 
individuals, groups, and the society as a whole as fair (e.g. Saad, 2011; Verboon and 
Goslinga, 2009; Wenzel, 2002, 2003). 
However, scholars have realized that the fairness of outcomes (i.e. distributive 
justice) is insufficient to understand the behavior of members of social collectives. In 
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particular, it is also relevant to consider the perceived fairness of the decision-making 
procedures that authorities apply in enacting rules, resolving disputes, and allocating 
resources (i.e. procedural justice; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). Various 
factors affect the perceived fairness of procedures. Some of these factors include consistent 
application of the procedures across time, absence of decision-makers’ self-interest in the 
process, decisions being based on accurate information, and allowing decision recipients to 
voice their opinions in the decision-making processes (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut and 
Walker, 1975; van den Bos et al., 1996). Authorities’ procedural justice is known to beget 
positive attitudes and cooperative behaviors from followers (Thibaut and Walker, 1975; 
Tyler and Blader, 2000). Some examples of such effects of procedural justice in various 
settings include rule-following (e.g. Tyler, 2009), and public support for police (e.g. Jason 
and Tyler, 2003). In the tax compliance literature also, studies show that procedural justice 
stimulates voluntary compliance with tax laws (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy 
and Tyler, 2008).  
However, scholars have recognized that distributive justice and procedural justice 
should not be studied in isolation, but rather as interactive predictors of responses to 
authorities and the system they represent (e.g. Bianchi et al., 2015; Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 
1996; De Cremer, 2005). The Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction has been 
studied from different angles. Some researchers showed that procedural justice is more likely 
to influence peoples' reactions to a decision when distributive justice is low (vs. high; e.g. 
Shapiro, 1991). Others showed that distributive justice is more likely to predict individuals’ 
reactions when procedural justice is low (vs. high; e.g. Brockner et al., 1994). However, both 
ways of zooming in on the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction imply, as 
noted earlier, that high procedural justice or high distributive is sufficient to lead to positive 
responses to the authority. Put differently, negative responses result only when procedural 
justice and distributive justice are both low. 
The effect of the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction on responses to 
authorities and the collective they represent has been explained in terms of various theories, 
including referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1987), the instrumental model of justice 
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975), and the group value model (Lind and Tyler, 1988). Brockner 
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and Wiesenfeld (1996) and De Cremer et al. (2010) argued that all of these explanations can 
be understood as emphasizing a sense-making process: Individuals interpret and assign 
meaning to events and encounters, particularly in response to negative, unexpected, or 
ambiguous circumstances (see Jones and Skarlicki, 2013; Weick, 1995). To assign meaning, 
people consider other aspects of the situation. For example, unfair (vs. fair) outcomes are 
perceived as negative; this makes people want to make sense of their surroundings: “Can I 
understand something about why this negative experience materialized and how bad the 
future will look?” Procedural justice provides a partial answer to this question, in the sense 
that low procedural justice communicates that unfair outcomes result from an unfair 
decision-making procedure and are thus likely to continue into the future. Fair procedures, 
on the other hand, suggest that the unfair outcomes result from chance, or at least from a less 
stable factor, and are therefore less likely to continue into the future. This results in a 
relatively strong positive effect of distributive justice on responses to authorities when 
procedural justice is low (vs. high).  
4.2.2 The Role of Legitimate Power 
The sense-making process described above suggests a role for the legitimate power of the 
enacting authority. In the tax compliance literature, legitimate power of the tax authority has 
been conceptualized as a form of power wielded by the authority that is adopted to protect 
cooperative citizens from exploitation by free-riding ones (see Kastlunger et al., 2013). This 
conceptualization echoes views of legitimate power in social psychology as implying that an 
authority has a stable position from which (s)he can serve the social system that (s)he leads 
(see Van Dijke et al., 2010). Because fair (vs. unfair) procedures are taken by individuals as 
communicating a positive future (and are therefore particularly effective in the face of low, 
rather than high distributive  
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justice), we expect that the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction materializes 
only when the enacting authority has high, rather than low, legitimate power. When the 
authority is low in legitimate power, procedural justice is less likely to be viewed as 
communicating a positive future in the face of low distributive justice. The above argument 
results in our hypothesis: 
Legitimate power of the tax authority moderates the interaction effect of procedural 
and distributive justice of the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance, such that the 
Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction will be restricted to authorities who 
have high (vs. low) legitimate power. 
4.3 Overview of Studies 
We tested our hypothesis in two field studies. Study 1 is a survey undertaken in Ethiopia in 
which we collected data from working professionals in the capital, Addis Ababa. We used 
existing and validated scales for all the variables of our study. Study 2 is a survey in which 
we obtained data from US taxpayers. Our hypothesis concerns the effect of the interaction 
Legitimate Power 
Distributive Justice 
Procedural Justice 
Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Figure 4.1. How Legitimate Power Moderates the Interaction Effect of Procedural Justice and 
Distributive Justice on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
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between procedural and distributive justice (as further moderated by legitimate power) on 
voluntary tax compliance. For discriminant validity purposes, we therefore also included 
enforced tax compliance as a criterion variable. Enforced tax compliance refers to the extent 
to which citizens comply with tax rules and regulations because they feel forced to do so 
(i.e. out of fear of being punished upon non-compliance; Gangl et al., 2015; Gobena and Van 
Dijke, 2016; Kirchler et al., 2008). Neither the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice 
interaction nor the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power interaction 
should predict enforced tax compliance.  
As a further test of the unique role of legitimate power in moderating the Procedural 
Justice × Distributive Justice interaction on voluntary tax compliance, in Study 2 we added 
coercive power of the tax authority as an additional moderator. Coercive power refers to 
authorities’ ability to inflict punishment upon taxpayers (Kastlunger et al., 2013). If our 
argument is valid that legitimate power further moderates the Procedural Justice × 
Distributive Justice interaction because it reflects the extent to which the authority is viewed 
as having the best interests of the collective at heart (rather than only as the extent to which 
the authority has power), the moderating role of legitimate power should not generalize to 
coercive power. 
4.4 Study 1 
4.4.1 Method 
4.4.1.1 Respondents 
We gathered data from 273 working professionals in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, 
over three months (March-May, 2016). Of the respondents, 88% were male and 12% were 
female. As for their age categories, 41% were between 20 and 30 years, 41% between 31 and 
40, 16% between 41 and 50, 1% between 51 and 60, and 1% above 60 years of age. In terms 
of educational status, 1% of the respondents had completed elementary education only, 5% 
had a (2-year) college diploma, 52% had a bachelor’s degree, 35% had completed a master’s 
degree, and 7% had completed a PhD. With respect to their annual earnings, 31% of the 
respondents reported to have had annual earnings of 20,000–40,000 Ethiopian Birr (1 Birr = 
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approximately USD .05), 25% had earned 40,000–60,000 Birr, 8% had earned 60,000–
80,000 Birr, 20% had earned 80,000–100,000 Birr, 5% had earned 100,000–120,000 Birr, 
and 11% had earned more than 120,000 Birr. Asked about their experiences with the tax 
authority, 7% of the respondents reported to have had less than 2 years of experience with 
the tax authority, 20% had 2–6 years, 35% had 6–10 years, 29% had 10–20 years, and 9% 
had greater than 20 years of experience. With regard to their ethnicity, 29% of our respondents 
reported being Amhara, 16% as Tigray, 34% as Oromo, 3% as Gurage, 18 as “other.”  
4.4.1.2 Procedure  
We used a printed questionnaire to collect data for this study. We distributed a total of 487 
questionnaires to respondents. Accompanying the questionnaire were a cover letter and a return 
postage-paid envelope for enclosing the filled-out questionnaire. The cover letter explained the 
purpose of the study and assured strict anonymity of responses. With a few lagging 
respondents, assistant data collectors repeatedly made visits to their offices, met them on 
streets, and made phone calls to remind them of the questionnaire (to ensure a reasonable 
response rate for a questionnaire on a sensitive issue). The role of the assistant data collectors 
was restricted to transferring enclosed, filled-in questionnaires to the researchers; they could 
in no way endanger the anonymity of the respondents. Eventually, 284 questionnaires were 
returned (a response rate of 58%). Of these, eleven respondents skipped a significant number 
of questions and were therefore removed from the dataset. Consequently, a total of 273 usable 
questionnaires were included in the analyses.  
4.4.1.3 Measures 
We measured procedural justice with a 7-item scale developed and validated by Colquitt 
(2001). We used this scale rather than scales that have been used before in the tax compliance 
literature because the former scale includes items that measure strictly procedural justice 
factors (see e.g. Leventhal, 1980). Other procedural justice measures in the tax compliance 
literature such as Murphy’s (2004) measure contain items that measure the trustworthiness of 
the tax authority rather than procedural justice features proper. We slightly adapted the 
Colquitt (2001) items to fit the context of procedural justice of the tax authority. Item examples 
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(preceded by the stem “The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-
related decisions.”) are “I have been able to express my views and feelings during those 
procedures” and “Procedures have been applied consistently” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). We averaged these items into a procedural justice scale. 
We measured distributive justice of the tax authority with a 5-item scale from Verboon 
and Van Dijke (2007). Item examples are “The use I make of all kinds of social services 
reflects in a proper way the taxes I pay” and “Regarding social services I get little return for 
my tax money” (reverse coded) (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). We averaged 
these items into a distributive justice scale. 
We measured the tax authority’s legitimate power with a 5-item scale from Kastlunger 
et al. (2013). Item examples are “Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases” 
and “Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). We averaged the items into a legitimate power scale.  
We measured voluntary tax compliance with a 5-item scale from Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem “When I pay my taxes as required by the 
Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so...”) are “... because to me it’s obvious that this is 
what you do” and “... to support the state and other citizens” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). We averaged the items to create a voluntary tax compliance index. 
We measured enforced tax compliance with the 5-item scale from Kirchler and Wahl 
(2010). Item examples (preceded by the stem ‘‘When I pay my taxes as required by the 
Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so. . .”) are ‘‘. . . because a great many tax audits are 
carried out” and ‘‘. . . because the tax office often carries out audits” (1 = strongly disagree, 
7 = strongly agree). We averaged the items to create an enforced tax compliance index. 
4.4.2 Results 
Table 4.1 presents means, standard deviations, Cronbach alpha coefficients, and correlations 
between the study variables.  
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Before testing our hypothesis, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to 
assess whether the scale items adequately represent their intended underlying constructs 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Bandalos, & Finney, 2001). We estimated a model with five 
latent variables (voluntary tax compliance, enforced tax compliance, procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and legitimate power) as well as a one-factor model in which all items 
loaded on to one factor. We also ﬁtted a six-factor model, which included the five latent 
variables together with a common method factor that was uncorrelated to the theoretically 
derived factors (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). To judge the goodness of fit of the models, we 
relied on the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger,1990), the 
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999), and the parsimony adjusted 
comparative ﬁt index (PCFI; Byrne, 2016). The fit of the five-factor model was acceptable 
(χ2(318) = 642.74, RMSEA = .061 (90% CI = .054 – .068), CFI = .92, PCFI = .83) after 
allowing the error terms of item 1 and 2 of the procedural justice scale (see Appendix A) to 
covary. This covariation of the first two procedural justice items reflects prior research 
showing that the procedural justice scale has two components, that is, follower control 
(reflecting these two items) and leader benevolence (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2010). The 
ﬁt of the one-factor model was clearly insufﬁcient (χ2(325) = 2309.79, RMSEA = .15 (90% 
CI  = .144 – .156), CFI = .52, PCFI = .48). The six-factor model (adding a common method 
factor to the five-factor model), also ﬁtted the data well (χ2(292) = 518.71, RMSEA = 
.053(90% CI = .046 – .061), CFI = .95, PCFI = .78). Although some ﬁt indices indicate a 
slightly better ﬁt for the six-factor model (i.e. CFI, RMSEA), the PCFI for this model is 
clearly lower than for the five-factor model and, in fact, below the accepted threshold of .80 
(Byrne, 2016). Thus, the CFAs support the validity of our speciﬁed measurement model. In 
fact, even if we accept the weak evidence for common method variance from the six-factor 
model, this does not preclude testing our hypothesis, as this concerns an interaction effect, 
which cannot be explained by common method variance (Evans, 1985). 
We tested our hypothesis using hierarchical regression analyses. In step 1, we entered 
the main effects of distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimate power. In step 2, 
we entered the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction, the Procedural Justice × 
Legitimate Power interaction, and the Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power interaction. 
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In step 3, we entered the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power 
interaction. (We standardized distributive justice, procedural justice, and legitimate power 
before calculating the interaction terms.) Table 4.2 presents the results of the regression 
analyses. 
Table 4.1. Regression Results of Study 1 
Dependent Variable Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Enforced Tax 
Compliance 
Step 1, R2, R2adj .28***, .27*** .05**, .04** 
Distributive Justice .30 (5.50)*** .01 (.16) 
Procedural Justice .34 (5.29)*** .25 (3.33)** 
Legitimate Power -.004 (-.06) -.10 (-1.46) 
Step 2, R2, R2adj, R2change .29, .27, .01 .06, .03, .01 
Distributive Justice .31 (5.54)*** .002 (.03) 
Procedural Justice .33 (4.87)*** .27 (3.57)*** 
Legitimate Power -.003 (-.05) -.11 (-1.53) 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  -.09 (-1.37) .12 (1.57) 
Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power .05 (.81) -.07 (-.92) 
Procedural Justice × Legitimate Power .05 (.90) -.02 (-.38) 
Step 3, R2, R2adj, R2change .30*, .29*, .02* .06, .03, .001 
Procedural Justice .31 (4.62)*** .27 (3.49)** 
Distributive Justice .39 (6.14)*** .02 (.24) 
Legitimate Power .04 (.55) -.10 (-1.38) 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  -.12 (-1.88) .11 (1.44) 
Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power .06 (.94) -.07 (-.89) 
Procedural Justice × Legitimate Power .02 (.31) -.03 (-.48) 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice 
×      
Legitimate Power 
 
-.16 (-2.55) * 
 
-.03 (-.46) 
N = 273; Table presents standardized β coefficients and t values in brackets; * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001 
86 
 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, consistent with prior findings, the main effects of procedural 
and distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance are significant; the main effect of 
legitimate power did not significantly predict voluntary tax compliance.  
In line with our hypothesis, in step 3, the three-way interaction between procedural 
justice, distributive justice, and legitimate power was significant. Figure 4.2 visually 
presents the shape of this interaction. We proceeded to decompose this interaction with 
simple slopes analyses (Aiken and West, 1991). These analyses showed that the Procedural 
Justice × Distributive Justice interaction significantly predicted voluntary tax compliance 
when legitimate power of the tax authority was high (1 SD above the mean; β = -.35, t = -
2.77, p = .01). However, when legitimate power was low (1 SD below the mean), the 
Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction did not significantly predict compliance 
(β = .002, t = .02, p = .99). 
Because the two-way Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction 
significantly predicted compliance, we proceeded with further simple slopes tests to 
decompose this interaction. The results of this analysis showed that when legitimate power 
was high (1 SD above the mean) and procedural justice was low (1 SD below the mean), the 
relationship between distributive justice and voluntary tax compliance was positive and 
significant (β = .49, t = 4.67, p < .01). When legitimate power was low (1 SD below the 
mean) and procedural justice was high (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance was also positive, albeit not significant (β 
= .23, t = 1.42, p = .16).  
However, our argument implies that when legitimate power of the tax authority is 
high, lowered voluntary tax compliance results only when procedural justice and distributive 
justice are both low. Figure 4.2 appears to be in line with this predicted pattern. To formally 
test this pattern, we tested the simple slopes of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance when distributive justice was high (vs. low) and when the legitimate power of 
the tax authority was perceived to be high (vs. low). The results of this analysis showed that 
when legitimate power was high (1 SD above the mean) and distributive justice was low (1 
SD below the mean), the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax 
compliance was positive and significant (β = .57, t = 2.53, p < .01). When legitimate power 
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was low (1 SD below the mean) and distributive justice was high (1 SD below the mean), 
the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance was not significant 
(β = .13, t = .62, p = .53). 
These results thus indicate that procedural justice and distributive justice interact to 
predict voluntary tax compliance, such that voluntary tax compliance is low only when 
procedural and distributive justice are both low. But this interaction is restricted to tax 
authorities who are high in legitimate power. In further evidence of our argument, Table 4.2 
also shows that procedural justice, distributive justice, and legitimate power of the tax 
authority did not interact to predict enforced tax compliance. 
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Figure 4.2. The Significant Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice Interaction’s Effect on 
Voluntary Tax Compliance when Legitimacy is High (Upper Panel) and the Non-Significant 
Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice Interaction’s Effect on Voluntary Tax Compliance 
when Legitimacy is Low (Lower Panel) (Study 1) 
4.4.3 Discussion 
One limitation of this study is that the data we used to test our hypothesis were gathered 
from a specific tax climate. That is, we gathered the data from Ethiopian taxpayers, and 
Ethiopia is characterized by a strained relationship between taxpayers and the tax authority 
(Abdella and Clifford, 2010; Bekana et al., 2014; Gobena and Van Dijke, 2016). As a result, 
it may not warrant validity in friendly tax climates such as those in the Western nations. The 
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second limitation is that we did not include coercive power of the tax authority in the analysis 
to determine whether the result we obtained for legitimate power would also apply to 
coercive power (it should not, according to our argument). In Study 2 we sought to replicate 
our findings obtained in the Ethiopian context in a very different taxation climate, that is, 
among US income taxpayers, and to include coercive power to address the second limitation 
of Study 1. Our thinking was that if we could replicate our finding in such a different taxation 
climate, it would enhance the confidence we have in our conclusions. 
4.5 Study 2 
4.5.1 Method 
We recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT offers online access 
to a large pool of respondents, which makes data collection faster and inexpensive 
(Buhrmester et al., 2011). AMT has become a widely used tool for collecting data across a 
wide range of the social sciences (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Goodman, 2013). Studies that 
have employed AMT cover topics as diverse as procedural justice (Van Dijke et al., 2015) 
and acting professionally (Uhlmann et al., 2013). Evaluative studies show that the reliability 
of data collected via AMT for both survey and experimental studies mirrors (and sometimes 
is even superior to) that of data obtained using traditional methods (Bartneck, 2015; Behrend 
et al., 2011; Casler et al., 2013; Holden et al., 2013).  
4.5.1.1 Sample and Procedure 
Respondents, who currently have work that earns them taxable income and hence have 
experience with the tax authority, were invited online to participate in the study. All 248 
respondents recruited for the study responded to all questions, and hence there were no 
dropouts or missing values. We introduced the study as being about “individuals’ interactions 
with authorities.” Of the 248 respondents, 48% were male and 52% were female. With regard 
to age, 30% were between 20 and 30 years, 30% between 31 and 40, 18% between 41 and 50, 
12% between 51 and 60, and 10% above 60 years of age.  In terms of their highest level of 
education, 1% had completed elementary school only, 24% had a high school diploma, 15% 
had completed vocational education, 46% had a bachelor’s degree, 10% had completed a 
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master’s degree, and 4% had completed a PhD. With respect to their annual earnings, 18% of 
the respondents reported having annual earnings less than 20,000 USD, 13% had earned 
20,000–29,999 USD, 20% had earned 30,000–39,999 USD, 13% had earned 40,000–49,999 
USD, and 36% had earned 50,000 USD or more. Among the respondents, 6% reported that 
they had less than 2 years of experience with the tax authority; 17% had 2–6 years; 14% had 
6–10 years; 27% had 10–20 years; and 36% had more than 20 years of experience. Regarding 
ethnic background, 88% of respondents identified themselves as White/Caucasian, 4% as 
Hispanic American, 4% as African American, 2% as Asian American, 1% as Native 
American, and 1% as “other” than those listed.  
4.5.1.2 Measures 
We measured all study variables (i.e. procedural justice, distributive justice, legitimate power, 
and voluntary tax compliance) with the same scales as in Study 1, except for some wording 
changes in which “Ethiopia” was replaced by “the US.” All variables were measured on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). In Study 2, we also included a 
measure of coercive power. We measured the tax authority’s coercive power with a 5-item 
scale taken from Kastlunger et al. (2013). Item examples are ‘‘Tax authorities primarily aim 
to punish” and ‘‘Tax authorities’ interventions are too severe” (1 = completely disagree, 7 = 
completely agree). We averaged the items into a coercive power scale. 
4.5.2 Results 
Table 4.3 presents means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, and 
correlations between the study variables.  
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Like in Study 1, we conducted CFAs. The fit of the 5-factor model was acceptable 
(χ2(318) = 774.42, RMSEA = .076 (90% CI = .069  – .083), CFI = .90, PCFI = .81) with all 
items loading signiﬁcantly onto their predicted factor when the error terms of item 1 and 2 
of the procedural justice scale were allowed to covary. The ﬁt of the one-factor model was 
unacceptable (χ2(325) = 2543.84, RMSEA =.166 (90% CI = .160 – .172), CFI = .49, PCFI 
= .45). The fit of the six-factor model was also acceptable (χ2(292) = 650.98, RMSEA = .071 
(90% CI = .063 – .078), CFI = .92, PCFI = .76). As in Study 1, although some ﬁt indices 
indicate a slightly better ﬁt for the six-factor model (i.e. CFI, RMSEA), the PCFI for of this 
model is lower than for the five factor model and, in fact, clearly below the accepted 
threshold of .80. In sum, the CFAs in this study also support the validity of our speciﬁed 
measurement model. 
As in Study 1, we tested our hypothesis using hierarchical regression analyses. We 
entered the main effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, and legitimate power, as 
well as their interactions, in the same way as we did in Study 1. Table 4.4 presents the results. 
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Table 4.2. Regression Results of Study 2 with Legitimate Power as Boundary Condition 
Dependent Variable Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Enforced Tax 
Compliance 
Step 1, R2, R2adj .36***, .35*** .13***, .12*** 
Distributive Justice .29 (5.05)*** -.29 (-4.30)*** 
Procedural Justice .43 (6.47)*** -.06 (-.81) 
Legitimate Power -.05 (-.79) .28 (3.94)*** 
Step 2, R2, R2adj, R2change .36, .35, .01 .14, .12, .01 
Distributive Justice .30 (5.13)*** -.28 (-4.10)*** 
Procedural Justice .41 (5.90)*** -.06 (-.69) 
Legitimate Power -.04 (-.60) .28 (3.84)*** 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  -.08 (-1.14) .06 (.72) 
Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power .09 (1.25) .02 (.25) 
Procedural Justice × Legitimate Power -.02 (-.37) -.03 (-.44) 
Step 3, R2, R2adj, R2change .37*, .36*, .01* .15, .12, .01 
Distributive Justice .36 (5.59)*** -.22 (-2.97)** 
Procedural Justice .40 (5.83)*** -.06 (-.77) 
Legitimate Power .00 (-.01) .31 (4.16)*** 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  -.09 (-1.36) .04 (.55) 
Distributive Justice × Legitimate Power .09 (1.36) .03 (.33) 
Procedural Justice × Legitimate Power -.02 (-.39) -.03 (-.45) 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice 
× Legitimate Power 
 
-.13 (-2.16) * 
 
-.12 (-1.68) 
N = 248; Table presents standardized β coefficients and t values in brackets; * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001 
As shown in Table 4.4, consistent with the results in Study 1, the main effects of 
procedural and distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance are significant; the main effect 
of legitimate power did not significantly predict voluntary tax compliance.  
Similar to our finding in Study1, in support of our hypothesis, the three-way interaction 
between procedural justice, distributive justice, and legitimate power was significant. Figure 
4.3 visually presents the shape of this interaction. We proceeded to decompose this 
interaction with simple slopes analyses (Aiken and West, 1991). These analyses showed that 
when legitimate power was high (1 SD above the mean), the Procedural Justice × 
Distributive Justice interaction was significantly related to voluntary tax compliance (β = -
.18, t = -2.19, p = .03). However, when legitimate power was low (1 SD below the mean), 
the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction was not significantly related to 
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voluntary tax compliance (β = -.003, t = -.04, p = .97).  
Because the simple Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction significantly 
predicted voluntary tax compliance among citizens who perceive the tax authority to wield 
high legitimate power but not among those who perceive the tax authority to wield low 
legitimate power, we proceeded, as in Study 1, with further simple slopes tests in which we 
decomposed the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction among citizens who 
perceive the tax authority to wield high legitimate power. The results of this analysis showed 
that when legitimate power was high (1 SD above the mean) and procedural justice was low 
(1 SD below the mean), the relationship between distributive justice and voluntary tax 
compliance was positive and significant (β = .46, t = 4.62, p < .01). When legitimate power 
was high (1 SD above the mean) and procedural justice was high (1 SD above the mean), the 
relationship between distributive justice and compliance was not significant (β = .20, t = 
2.09, p = .21).  
As stated earlier, our argument implies that when legitimate power of the tax 
authority is high, lowered voluntary tax compliance is predicted only when procedural 
justice and distributive justice are both low. Similar to Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 appears to be 
in line with this predicted pattern. To formally test this pattern, we tested the simple slopes 
of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance when distributive justice was high (vs. 
low), and when the legitimate power of the tax authority was perceived to be high (vs. low). 
The results of this analysis showed that when legitimate power was high (1 SD above the 
mean) and distributive justice was low (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between 
procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance was positive and significant (β = .53, t = 
3.61, p < .01). When legitimate power was low (1 SD below the mean) and distributive 
justice was high (1 SD below the mean), the relationship between procedural justice and 
voluntary tax compliance was not significant (β = .32, t = 1.71, p = .09). 
 
95 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. The Significant Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice Interaction’s 
Effect on Voluntary Tax Compliance when Legitimacy is High (Upper Panel) and 
the Non-Significant Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice Interaction’s Effect on 
Voluntary Tax Compliance when Legitimacy is Low (Lower Panel) (Study 2)  
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4.6 General Discussion 
One important ethical dilemma that individuals face is whether to comply with tax laws and 
regulations, where the personal gains that result from non-compliance come at a cost for 
society and its members. We tested in an Ethiopian (Study 1) and US (Study 2) sample of 
income taxpayers if the “classic” Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction (i.e. 
responses being less positive only when procedural and distributive justice are low) is 
restricted to tax authorities who have high, rather than low, legitimate power. We obtained this 
predicted three-way interaction only on voluntary, and not on enforced, tax compliance. And 
the role of the tax authority’s power in moderating the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice 
was restricted to legitimate (rather than coercive) power (see Appendix B). In the following 
sections, we discuss the implications and limitations of this research.  
4.6.1 Theoretical Implications 
Procedural and distributive justice are important as antecedents of voluntary tax compliance 
(e.g. Wenzel, 2002, 2003). However, the interaction term between these two types of justice 
in predicting voluntary tax compliance has not been studied to date. We identified legitimate 
power wielded by the tax authority as a boundary condition to the interactive effect of 
procedural and distributive justice on voluntary tax compliance. This increases our 
understanding of when and how procedural and distributive justice moderate each other’s 
effect to shape voluntary tax compliance. We argued that taxpayers who perceive their 
current taxation encounters with the tax authority as negative and unexpected want to make 
sense of their surroundings. Procedural justice is instrumental in sense making, in the sense 
that low procedural justice communicates that unfair outcomes resulting from an unfair 
decision-making procedure are thus likely to continue into the future. In contrast, fair 
procedures inform the taxpayers that the unfair outcomes resulted by chance and are less 
likely to continue in the future. This perception results in a relatively strong positive effect 
of procedural justice on response to authorities when distributive justice is low (vs. high). 
However, in support of this sense-making analysis, we found that the Procedural Justice × 
Distributive Justice interaction was limited to authorities who were high (vs. low) in 
legitimate power. Legitimate power represents the extent to which the tax authority has a 
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stable position from which (s)he can serve the social system that (s)he leads (see Van Dijke 
et al., 2010). Thus, we not only introduce the established Procedural Justice × Distributive 
Justice interaction to understand tax compliance, but also contribute to understanding the 
process that underlies this interaction effect. 
Second, our cross-cultural studies with two samples that strongly differ in terms of 
tax climates serve the purpose of filling the void in studies that compare the voluntary tax 
compliance behavior of developed and developing countries (Gobena and Van Dijke, 2016). 
Our study uniquely explores how social psychological and deterrent factors moderate each 
other in stimulating voluntary tax compliance across culturally different samples—one in 
Ethiopia and the other in the US. Accordingly, we contribute to the ecological validity of 
integrative roles of social psychological and deterrence factors on tax compliance. Deterrent 
factors are those factors that force individuals to behave against their will; one of such factors 
is power wielded by authorities (Kastlunger et al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 2008). Deterrent 
factors belong to a distinct stream of research on tax compliance behavior that presumes that 
taxpayers’ compliance with taxation laws and rules depends on their self-interest and 
consequent comparison of the costs and benefits of evading taxes (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972). The deterrent line of research is based on the notion that taxpayers are selfish and 
will decide to pay taxes only when they perceive the expected costs of evading taxes (i.e. 
tax audits and subsequent punishments) to outweigh the benefits of evasion (i.e. money 
saved from unpaid taxes). 
4.6.2 Practical Implications 
We contribute to the practice of tax administration in two ways. First, prior research focused 
on the main effects of procedural and distributive justice (e.g. Saad, 2011; Wenzel, 2003). 
Unfortunately, taxpayers often perceive distributive justice as low, owing, for example, to 
judgment of their exchange with the government as unfair, inequitable distribution of tax 
burdens and benefits, or simply because they view paying taxes as unfavorable, which taints 
distributive justice perceptions. We showed, however, that high rather than low procedural 
justice of the tax authorities buffers the effects of lowered perceived distributive justice. 
Therefore, tax authorities can stimulate a higher level of tax compliance by making their 
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decision-making procedures free of their own self-interest, basing taxation decisions on 
accurate information, and letting the taxpayers voice their opinions in the decisions. 
Second, a policy alternative to deal with taxpayers is for the tax authority to work in 
such a way that it would be perceived as high in procedural justice and legitimacy in situations 
where taxpayers perceive the authority as low in distributive justice, or to be sufficiently 
coercive in order to deter tax evasion. The coercion option is being followed by most 
authorities in developing countries, who care less about being perceived as procedurally and 
distributively just and hence are often perceived by taxpayers as illegitimate (Bekana et al., 
2014; Fjeldstad, 2001; Gobena and Van Dijke, 2016). The coercion approach is costly, 
though, and arguably depletes the meager tax money that authorities in such an antagonistic 
climate could collect (Alm et al., 2012; Gangl et al., 2015; Murphy, 2008). Therefore, our 
findings highlight that procedural justice is particularly important in order to foster voluntary 
tax compliance for authorities who are perceived by taxpayer citizens as low in distributive 
justice but high in legitimacy. We note, however, that it is not easy for the tax authorities in 
developing countries to be perceived as just and legitimate while in an antagonistic tax climate, 
and they should strive to bring about a friendly tax environment in the first place. Such nations 
are advised to gradually build legitimacy by increasing the percentage of tax evasion they 
detect, combating tax evasion crimes in an efficient manner, frequently penalizing tax evaders, 
and having convincing knowledge and competence to detect tax evasion. 
4.6.3 Limitations 
As with all research, our studies are not free from limitations. A first limitation is the cross-
sectional nature of the studies, which does not allow us to draw causal conclusions. Future 
studies are warranted to clarify the causal links between the variables using experimental or 
longitudinal designs. Yet, we note that prior experimental studies revealed that procedural 
justice causes voluntary tax compliance (e.g. Doyle, Gallery, Coyle, & Commissioners, 
2009; Van Dijke and Verboon, 2010; Wenzel, 2006). 
A second limitation is that we studied a highly sensitive subject (i.e. tax compliance 
behavior) based on self-reported data, which has been criticized on the ground that 
respondents may fear to provide genuine answers to questions about tax evasion/compliance 
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(Tauchen, 1987; Torgler, 2003). This arguably is attributable to respondents’ concerns that 
genuine answers to such questions would mean confessing their taxation crimes (Hessing et 
al., 1988). Nevertheless, the use of self-reported measures in the tax compliance literature is 
common (e.g. Gobena and Van Dijke, 2016; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Wahl et al., 2010). 
Research examining the convergence of data from self-reported and objective compliance 
measures documented inconsistent results. Hessing et al.(1988), for instance, documented 
weak correlations between data from self-reported compliance and objective compliance 
measures, whereas Hite (1988) and Tittle (1980) found relatively strong correlations 
between the two datasets. The divergence between self-reported and objective measures 
might be because the two measures do not measure the same construct, leading them to be 
prone to different types of biases (e.g. Van Dijke and Verboon, 2010). Specifically, while 
self-reported data may be prone to memory lapses and self-presentation biases, objective 
compliance measures may fail to detect various types of non-compliance behavior. To 
overcome this limitation, we suggest future research employing objective measures of tax 
compliance to test our hypothesis. 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
Procedural justice and distributive justice have both been identified as useful tools to 
stimulate voluntary tax compliance. The present research helps us to understand the 
interactive effect of these two types of justice on voluntary tax compliance, setting legitimate 
power of the tax authority as a boundary condition to the interactive relationship. In taking 
this approach, we show that fair procedures can make up for the perception of unfair 
outcomes, as long as the tax authority is perceived as wielding legitimate power. Integrating 
these separately established antecedents of voluntary tax compliance in two extremely 
divergent tax climates thus can result in theoretical progress as well as practically useful 
results that are respectively applicable in tax compliance literature and in improving tax 
administration. 
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Appendix A 
Below is a list of two of the measures used in this paper. All responses were on a Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = moderately disagree, 4 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Procedural Justice (Colquitt, 2001) 
The following items refer to the procedures used to arrive at tax-related decisions. 
8. I have been able to express my views and feelings during those procedures. 
9. I have had influence over the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
10. Those procedures have been applied consistently. 
11. Those procedures have been free of bias. 
12. Those procedures have been based on accurate information. 
13. I have been able to appeal the (outcomes) arrived at by those procedures. 
14. Those procedures have upheld ethical and moral standards. 
Distributive Justice (Verboon and Van Dijke, 2007) 
1. The use I make of all kinds of social services reflects in a proper way the taxes I 
pay. 
2. Regarding social services I get little return for my tax money; reverse coded. 
3. Some groups in society benefit more from the tax system than I do; reverse coded. 
4. I think it is not fair that some people pay less tax than me while they benefit equally 
from all amenities; reverse coded. 
5. I find that I have to pay too much tax; reverse coded. 
Legitimate Power of Tax Authority (Kastlunger et al., 2013) 
1. Tax evasion is detected in a high percentage of the cases. 
2. Tax authorities combat tax crimes in an efficient way. 
3. Tax evasion is likely to be detected. 
4. Tax authorities control frequently and profoundly. 
5. Due to their knowledge and competence, tax authorities are able to detect quite 
every act of tax evasion. 
Coercive Power of Tax Authority (Kastlunger et al., 2013) 
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1. Tax authorities primarily aim to punish. 
2. Tax authorities investigate as long as they find something. 
3. Tax authorities’ interventions are too severe. 
4. Tax authorities nurture hostile feelings towards taxpayers. 
5. Tax authorities interpret tax laws in order to punish the highest number of 
taxpayers. 
Voluntary Tax Compliance (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010) 
When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so... 
1. ... because to me it’s obvious that this is what you do. 
2. ... to support the state and other citizens. 
3. ... because I like to contribute to everyone’s good. 
4. ... because for me it’s the natural thing to do. 
5. ... because I regard it as my duty as a citizen. 
Enforced Tax Compliance (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010) 
When I pay my taxes as required by the Ethiopian tax laws and regulations, I do so.... 
1 …because a great many tax audits are carried out. 
2 ... because the tax authority often carries out audits. 
3 ... because I know that I will be audited. 
4 ... because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe. 
5 ... because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention. 
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Appendix B 
Table 4.3. Regression Results of Study 2 with Coercive Power as Boundary Condition 
Dependent Variable Voluntary Tax 
Compliance 
Step 1, R2, R2adj ..38***, .37*** 
Distributive Justice .21 (3.30)** 
Procedural Justice .38 (6.60)*** 
Coercive Power -.19 (-3.24)** 
Step 2, R2, R2adj, R2change .38, .37, .01 
Distributive Justice .22 (3.40)** 
Procedural Justice .36 (6.08)*** 
Coercive Power -.19 (-3.08)** 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  .01 (.19) 
Distributive Justice × Coercive Power .06 (.95) 
Procedural Justice × Coercive Power -.01 (-.04) 
Step 3, R2, R2adj, R2change .39, .37, .01 
Distributive Justice .20 (3.01)** 
Procedural Justice .32 (4.77)*** 
Coercive Power -.17 (-2.79)** 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice  -.03 (-.46) 
Distributive Justice × Coercive Power .02 (.32) 
Procedural Justice × Coercive Power -.02 (-.29) 
Distributive Justice × Procedural Justice × 
Coercive Power 
 
-.11 (-1.43) 
N = 248; Table presents standardized β coefficients and t values in brackets; * p < .05, ** p 
< .01, *** p < .001 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5  GENERAL DISCUSSION  
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This dissertation integrates a number of antecedents to voluntary tax compliance, with a 
specific focus on why and when procedural justice affects this type of compliance. 
Procedural justice has been shown to promote cooperative behavior in a number of different 
situations, including the reaction of employees to economic hardship in the event of a pay 
freeze (e.g. Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994), the reaction of employees to organizational 
change (e.g. Tyler, & De Cremer, 2005), law enforcement (Barkworth & Murphy, 2015), 
and support for authorities (e.g. Tyler & Degoey, 1995). In the tax compliance literature, 
procedural justice has also been shown to stimulate voluntary compliance with tax 
authorities’ decisions and goals (Farrar, 2015; Hartner et al., 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; 
Verboon & Goslinga, 2009), although this relationship has not always been found (e.g. 
Porcano, 1988; Wenzel, 2002; Worsham, 1996). Accordingly, it is worth exploring when 
and how procedural justice stimulates cooperation with tax authorities, and when and why 
it sometimes fails to do so. 
Recent research has acknowledged the need for incorporating other intervening 
variables in the relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance (e.g. 
Murphy, 2004; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). A comprehensive 
framework for integrating various factors from both the economic deterrence and social-
psychological streams is provided by the slippery slope framework, which focuses on the 
dynamics of power and trust (the latter being an important consequence of procedural 
justice) and their impact on the tax climate (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). 
Although the framework has been refined by distinguishing between legitimate and coercive 
power (Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015; Gangl, Hofmann, Pollai, & Kirchler, 2012), it 
has rarely been tested empirically, especially in developing countries. It is, therefore, 
necessary to identify both theoretically- and empirically-sound variables that clarify why 
procedural justice sometimes stimulates voluntary compliance with tax authorities and 
sometimes does not. 
I, together with the co-authors of the empirical papers presented in this dissertation, 
developed and tested hypotheses regarding the mediating and moderating roles of 
theoretically-grounded variables (i.e. trust in the tax authority, legitimate and coercive power 
wielded by the authority, the distributive justice of the authority, and the extent of the 
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taxpayers’ identification with their nation). Below I provide a brief summary of the main 
findings of the empirical work. I will then discuss these findings in more detail. This 
discussion focuses on the contribution of the research presented in this dissertation to the tax 
compliance literature. 
5.1 Summary of the Empirical Findings 
In Chapter 2, I explored the roles of legitimate and coercive power wielded by the tax 
authority and trust in the authority as moderators and a mediator, respectively, of the 
relationship between procedural justice of the authority and taxpayers’ voluntary compliance 
with the authority’s decisions and goals. I employed fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) 
and the slippery slope framework of tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008) 
as guiding frameworks to examine this proposed moderated mediation relationship. Fairness 
heuristic theory argues that individuals, in their decision to cooperate with authorities that 
represent a social collective, are faced with a fundamental social dilemma. The dilemma is 
between contributing to the collective (such as by voluntarily paying one’s taxes), which 
offers a sense of identity and belonging and opportunities for improved outcomes (e.g. a 
better functioning country), on one hand, and  refusal to contribute to the collective in fear 
of possible exploitation and identity damage due to abusive or rejecting authorities, on the 
other hand (Lind, 2001; Van Dijk, Parks, & Van Lange, 2013). In this dilemma, procedural 
justice communicates that authorities can be trusted not to abuse their power. Therefore, 
high procedural justice should stimulate more positive responses, such as increased tax 
compliance. 
The other theoretical foundation of the research presented in this chapter—the 
slippery slope framework—also posits that the power wielded by tax authorities and trust in 
these authorities moderate each other’s effect in stimulating voluntary tax compliance. To 
extend this assumption, I include trust in the tax authority as a mediator of the interactive 
effect of the power wielded by the authority and the procedural justice of the authority. In 
this study—conducted among business owners in Ethiopia—I found that procedural justice 
fosters voluntary tax compliance, particularly when the legitimate power of the tax authority 
is low (rather than high) and when the coercive power of the authority is high (rather than 
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low). In addition, I found support for the mediating role of (cognition-based) trust in the tax 
authority on the interactive effect of procedural justice and legitimate (but not coercive) 
power in shaping voluntary tax compliance. This is partly in line with the general conjecture 
in the slippery slope framework (Kirchler et al., 2008) that power and trust moderate each 
other’s effect, although this framework does not distinguish between legitimate and coercive 
power. I also found that the coercive power of the tax authority is positively related to 
enforced (but not voluntary) tax compliance. This latter finding is consistent with previous 
research, which documented a positive relationship between coercive power and enforced 
tax compliance (e.g. Gangl et al., 2015; Hofmann et al., 2014; Kastlunger et al., 2013). 
In chapter 3, with a view to furthering our understanding of why procedural justice 
sometimes (but not always) stimulates voluntary tax compliance, I identified identification 
with the nation as a boundary condition for the interactive effect of procedural justice and 
trust in the tax authority on voluntary tax compliance. I built this study on the work of Van 
Dijke and Verboon (2010), which documents the interactive effect of procedural justice and 
trust, such that the effect of procedural justice is most pronounced among citizens with low 
(rather than high) trust in the authority. Drawing from the fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 
2001) and relational models of procedural justice (Blader & Tyler, 2015), I predicted that the 
relationship between procedural justice and voluntary tax compliance, which has particularly 
been found among citizens with low (rather than high) trust in the tax authorities, is restricted 
to citizens who weakly (rather than strongly) identify with the nation. To test this prediction, 
I conducted two field studies in different countries, Ethiopia and the US. The results from 
both surveys indeed show that the Procedural Justice × Trust interaction is limited to citizens 
who weakly identify with the nation. 
Finally, to better understand the underlying process that explains why people 
exhibit cooperative responses to procedural justice, I drew on the well-documented 
interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice on cooperative behavior (e.g. Bianchi 
et al., 2015; Brockner, 2002). The interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice on 
reactions to authorities’ decisions usually means that high procedural justice or high 
distributive justice suffices to predict positive reactions to authorities’ decisions. This 
interactive effect has been extensively documented in organizational behavior studies (see 
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Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996 for an overview). Applying this interactive effect to tax 
compliance, I included legitimate power wielded by the tax authority as a boundary 
condition for the interactive effect. Building on a sense-making analysis of justice (Brockner 
& Wiesenfeld, 1996; De Cremer, Brockner, Fishman, Van Dijke, Van Olffen, & Mayer, 
2010), I examined whether or not the Procedural Justice × Distributive Justice interaction 
predicts voluntary (but not enforced) tax compliance, particularly when the tax authority has 
high (rather than low) legitimate power. Similar to chapter 3, I conducted two field studies 
in different countries, Ethiopia and the US. The results from both surveys support the 
prediction. 
5.2 Contributions to the Tax Compliance Literature  
This dissertation makes a number of theoretical contributions to the tax compliance 
literature.  The first contribution is that it clarifies the propositions contained in the slippery 
slope framework. The slippery slope framework and subsequent empirical tests posit that 
trust in authorities generally affects voluntary tax compliance, whereas the power of the tax 
authority affects enforced compliance (Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 2012; Kastlunger et 
al., 2013; Kirchler et al., 2008; Muehlbacher et al., 2011). The framework also conjectures 
that power and trust moderate each other’s effect on tax compliance, claiming that trust 
should matter most when power is low, because when power is at its maximum trust is less 
relevant as authorities can enforce compliance. Conversely, power should matter most when 
trust is low, as when trust is at its maximum variations in power are less relevant because 
citizens comply voluntarily, regardless of the level of power. While the initial slippery slope 
framework (Kirchler et al., 2008) did not distinguish between legitimate and coercive power, 
its extension (see Gangl et al., 2015) distinguishes between these two types of power. The 
extended framework notes that legitimate power and reason-based trust enhance each other’s 
effect, creating a service climate and, together, leading to voluntary cooperation with tax 
authorities. In this dissertation I, together with my co-authors, showed that legitimate and 
coercive power, in fact, have opposite moderating roles on the relationship between an 
important antecedent of trust in the tax authority—namely, the procedural justice of the 
authority—and, thus, voluntary tax compliance. The study also showed that (cognition-
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based) trust mediates the interactive effect of legitimate power and procedural justice, 
clarifying the mutual effect of legitimate power and reason-based trust noted above. 
The second contribution of this dissertation is that, unlike prior work, which often 
focused on the judgment phase of the fairness heuristic theory in both organizational 
psychology (e.g. Van den Bos et al., 1998) and the tax compliance context (e.g. Van Dijke 
& Verboon, 2010), this dissertation included a focus on the ‘use phase’ of the fairness 
heuristic theory. Lind (2001) categorized individuals’ utilization of fairness information in 
their decision-making processes into two episodes (phases). In the judgment phase, fairness 
judgments and the resulting trustworthiness assessments are formed. Subsequently, in the 
use phase, these assessments are used to decide whether or not to cooperate with the 
authority. This dissertation shows how individuals use trust (which is itself predicted by 
procedural justice) in combination with the tax authority’s use of power in order to reach a 
decision to either voluntarily comply with or defy the authority’s decisions and goals. In 
other words, taxpayers first assess the tax authority’s trustworthiness based on their 
judgement of procedural justice information and then assimilate this information with their 
perception of the use of legitimate power by the authority in order to decide whether or not 
comply with tax laws and regulations. 
A third contribution of this dissertation is that, by including both trust and 
identification with the nation as moderators of the effect of procedural justice on voluntary 
tax compliance, more is revealed about the nature of the moderating role of trust on the effect 
of procedural justice on tax compliance. Specifically, it was found (in line with previous 
work) that individuals respond positively (such as by voluntarily complying with tax 
authorities) to high procedural justice when they have low (rather than high) trust in the tax 
authority. This is because low trust makes individuals focus on procedural justice 
information to decide whether or not they may be taken advantage of when contributing to 
the collective (see Van Dijke & Verboon, 2010). Avoiding being taken advantage of by 
others implies a focus on one’s own potential outcomes (or losses); those who trust collective 
authorities less tend to value procedural justice information more than those who trust the 
authorities more, resulting in trust moderating the procedural justice effect (e.g. Van Dijke 
& Verboon, 2010). The research for this dissertation found that strong identification with 
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the nation overrides these self-focused concerns, as identification implies that one 
internalizes collective goals, thus making one less concerned with personal outcomes. 
Consequently, it contributes by suggesting that the processes underlying the fairness 
heuristic theory (Lind, 2001) are essentially self-focused in nature and that they vanish when 
there is strong identification with the nation. 
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is that it tests the widely-documented 
interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice on reactions to authorities’ decisions 
(primarily in organizational behavior) in the tax compliance context. More importantly, by 
including legitimate power wielded by the tax authority as a boundary condition for the 
procedural by distributive justice interaction, this research found that the interaction effect 
predicts voluntary tax compliance, particularly when the tax authority has high (rather than 
low) legitimate power. This implies that the tax authorities’ level of legitimacy plays a vital 
role in the procedural by distributive justice interaction to stimulate cooperation, such that 
these two elements of justice interactively influence cooperative behavior only when the 
authorities are viewed as high in legitimate power. 
A broader theoretical contribution that emerges from the research reported in this 
dissertation is the integration of the roles of deterrence-based predictors and social-
psychological predictors of tax compliance—factors that have generally been studied in 
isolation. Thus, this research integrates the role of two widely-acknowledged psychological 
factors (i.e. procedural justice and trust in the tax authority) with an instrumental factor—
the power (both legitimate and coercive) of the tax authority in relation to voluntary tax 
compliance. This finding increases our understanding of psychological and instrumental 
factors that recent frameworks suggest integrating (e.g. Alm, Kirchler, & Muehlbacher, 
2012; Gangl et al., 2015; Kirchler, 2007, Kirchler et al., 2008), by showing how both 
legitimate and coercive power moderate the effects of procedural justice and trust on 
voluntary tax compliance.  
A final broad theoretical implication can be derived from the testing of my 
hypotheses in samples that involve extremely diverging tax environments, one from the so-
called “cops and robbers” environment in Ethiopia and another from a more “client and 
service” environment in the US.  Unlike other studies, which usually apply theories and 
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models to tax compliance research in Western, developed nations, this dissertation tested the 
assumptions of many important theories and models, such as the fairness heuristic theory, 
the slippery slope framework of tax compliance, the relational model of procedural justice, 
and the sense-making model of justice in a developing country (i.e. Ethiopia). The findings 
suggest that many of the assumptions in these theories and models are not restricted to the 
context of developed countries. 
5.3 Contributions to Tax Administration Practices 
This dissertation also contributes to the practices used by tax authorities to ensure 
compliance. Most generally, it informs tax authorities about the conditions under which the 
well-documented positive effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax compliance can be 
enhanced. One such condition is when the legitimate power wielded by the tax authority is 
perceived by taxpayers as low. In this situation, procedural justice information will have 
more positive effects on both trust in the authority and voluntary tax compliance. Taxpayers 
may, for instance, perceive the tax authority as low in legitimate power if they view it as 
incompetent in enforcing tax laws and if they think it has failed to administer taxes efficiently 
(i.e. by incurring the lowest possible administrative costs). Another condition under which 
procedural justice becomes more important is when the tax authority is perceived as wielding 
high coercive power. Situations of high coercive power include indiscriminate frequent 
auditing of both genuine compliers, inadvertent tax evaders, and those who intentionally 
evade taxes (see Gangl et al., 2015). Thus, tax authorities should either be high in legitimacy 
to be able to secure taxpayers’ voluntary compliance without reference to trust and justice 
concerns, or be sufficiently coercive to the extent that taxpayers would seek to avoid strict 
measures. It is noted, however, that a high level of coercion damages trust in the tax authority 
and is costly as it provokes taxpayers into evasion in retaliation against the authority’s strict 
enforcement measures, requiring high investment in enforcement resources. 
Another situation in which procedural justice is particularly effective in stimulating 
voluntary tax compliance is when citizens weakly identify with the nation and when, 
simultaneously, their trust in the tax authority is low. Taxpayers may find it difficult to 
identify with their country as a result of shame caused by the tax authority’s behavior. One 
111 
 
 
instance of a tax authority’s behavior leading to low trust and low identification is 
corruption; in this situation citizens pay taxes, but the use of the tax money is not transparent 
and the citizenry suffer from acute shortages of basic necessities (such as food and shelter), 
as is the case in many African countries (see Fjeldstad, & Therkildsen, 2008). In fact, (tax) 
authorities should endeavor to nurture citizens’ identification with the nation, as this variable 
stands as a sufficient condition to stimulate voluntary tax compliance in its own right. 
Fourth, this research informs tax authorities that they can stimulate voluntary tax 
compliance by being perceived as just, either in their decision-making procedures or in the 
ultimate distribution of tax burdens and tax-funded benefits. But, when taxpayers deem the 
fairness of the distribution of tax burdens and benefits as low, tax authorities are advised to 
strive to be perceived as high in both their legitimacy and the fairness of their decision-
making processes. Only when high perceived procedural justice is coupled with high 
perceived legitimacy will it buffer the negative effect of low distributive justice. The fairness 
of the distribution by a tax system may be viewed as low when taxpayers feel that the tax 
authority serves some privileged groups over others or is committed to serving its own self-
interest (see Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1993; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001; Wenzel, 2003). 
Thus, tax officials ought to abstain from the discriminatory treatment of citizens and 
suppress their own self-interests if they are to be viewed as high in distributive justice.  
5.4 Limitations of the Dissertation 
Like any research, the research presented in this dissertation has its limitations. The first 
limitation derives from the measurement of the outcome variables in all studies. This 
measurement involves a sensitive subject measured using self-reporting methods. It has been 
noted that taxpayers’ responses to questions about their tax evasion behavior cannot be relied 
upon to be completely genuine, as respondents could be worried that they are admitting to a 
serious crime (see Tauchen, 1987; Torgler, 2003). Studies that seek to determine the 
convergence of data obtained from objective and self-reported measures of tax compliance 
show inconsistent results. Some studies report weak correlations (e.g. Hessing et al., 1988) 
and others show relatively strong correlations (e.g. Hite, 1988; Tittle, 1980). In fact, the two 
measures differ in an important way: while self-reporting likely suffers from memory lapses 
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and self-presentation biases, objective measures can fall short of detecting various forms of 
non-compliance behavior such as taxpayers seeking tax loopholes to pay as little tax as 
possible and creative efforts by entrepreneurs not to pay taxes at all (e.g. by engaging in 
underground business activities; Sandmo, 2011). Therefore, self-reporting measures were 
preferred to objective measures for the purpose of this study, as they capture the 
abovementioned behaviors, which are important to the studies and which are not captured 
by objective measures. 
Second, the use of a cross-sectional design in the studies makes causal claims 
impossible. However, confidence in the conclusions is boosted by prior experimental studies 
documenting a causal link between the main explanatory variable (i.e. procedural justice) 
and tax compliance (see Doyle et al., 2009; Van Dijke and Verboon, 2010; Wenzel, 2006). 
Future longitudinal research designs may even establish causal links between all variables. 
Third, the sampling methods used in the studies in this dissertation are not 
probabilistic owing to the impossibility of accessing taxpayers’ sensitive private 
information. As a result, convenience sampling was used, which restricts any attempt to 
generalize the findings to other settings than the samples included in the studies. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the intent in all of the studies was to test theories and 
models in the tax compliance context, rather than to generalize the findings to settings other 
than the samples. It has also been noted that when testing theory, all measures are indirect 
indicators of theoretical constructs, and no methodological procedures taken alone can 
produce external validity (see Lucas, 2003). Furthermore, the dissimilarity of the two 
samples in the studies presented in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation boosts the validity of 
the conclusions made. 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
Burgeoning work on tax compliance over the past half century or so has identified a 
multitude of factors that have shaped tax compliance behavior. These factors primarily fall 
into either the economic or deterrence categories (i.e. threatening taxpayers to enforce tax 
laws) or the social-psychological category, which relies on taxpayers’ voluntary deference 
to tax authorities’ decisions and goals. In this dissertation, the social-psychological approach 
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was emphasized, as it leads to less costly outcomes and provides a better explanation for the 
processes underlying tax compliance than the deterrence approach. One of the most widely-
acknowledged social-psychological factors stimulating voluntary compliance with the tax 
authority is the procedural justice of the authority. By considering the effects of various 
mediating and moderating variables on the effect of procedural justice on voluntary tax 
compliance, this dissertation furthers our understanding of the effect of procedural justice 
on voluntary tax compliance. More broadly, it integrates social-psychological factors among 
themselves, as well as with deterrence factors.  
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Summary 
This thesis explores the integrative effect of social psychological factors among themselves 
as well as with economic deterrent factors in stimulating voluntary tax compliance, 
contributing to the tax compliance literature a theoretically relevant integrative approach that 
bridges between social psychological and economic deterrence approaches. It also 
contributes to the ecological validity of research on tax compliance behavior by comparing 
samples of two tax environments that are extremely unlike—one from a developing country 
(i.e. Ethiopia) and another from a developed country (i.e. the US). 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter that seeks to introduce the thesis and 
summarize research on voluntary tax compliance, highlighting the need to integrate 
antecedents of voluntary tax compliance. Each of the three empirical chapters contributes to 
theoretical and empirical developments of the tax compliance literature.  
Chapter 2 explores the moderating roles of two (i.e. coercive and legitimate) types 
of power wielded by the tax authority in the relationship between procedural justice and 
voluntary tax compliance as mediated by (cognition-based) trust in the authority. This study 
finds support for the prediction that high (but not low) coercive and low (but not high) 
legitimate power of the tax authority moderate the positive relationship between procedural 
justice and voluntary tax compliance. Only procedural justice by legitimate power 
interaction has been mediated by (cognition-based) trust.  
Chapter 3 examines identification with the nation as a boundary condition to the 
interactive effect of procedural justice of and trust in the tax authority on voluntary tax 
compliance and finds support in two distinct samples for the prediction that the interactive 
effect (of procedural justice and trust) is significant among citizens who weakly (rather than 
strongly) identify with the nation.  
Chapter 4 explores legitimacy of the tax authority as a boundary condition to the 
interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice in stimulating voluntary tax 
compliance and finds support in two studies for the prediction that high (but not low) 
legitimate power moderates the interactive effect of procedural and distributive justice on 
voluntary tax compliance.  
Chapter 5 discusses in detail the empirical findings presented in this dissertation 
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with emphasis on their theoretical as well as practical contributions and limitations.   
 
Keywords: Procedural Justice, Distributive Justice, Cognition-based Trust, Legitimate 
Power, Coercive Power, Identification with the Nation, Voluntary Tax Compliance, 
Enforced Tax Compliance. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
In dit proefschrift wordt beschreven hoe sociaal psychologische factoren in onderlinge 
samenhang en in samenhang met economische factoren vrijwillige belasting-naleving 
voorspellen. Daarmee wordt een theoretisch relevante bijdrage geleverd aan de literatuur 
over belasting-naleving die een brug slaat tussen sociaal psychologische en economische 
benaderingen van dit onderwerp. Het onderzoek draagt ook bij aan de ecologische validiteit 
van het onderzoek naar belasting-naleving door het vergelijken van steekproeven uit twee 
zeer verschillende belastingomgevingen - één uit een ontwikkelingsland (Ethiopië) en een 
ander uit een ontwikkeld land (de VS). 
Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert het proefschrift en vat het onderzoek samen.  
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de modererende rollen van twee soorten macht (d.w.z. 
dwang- en legitieme macht) van de belastingautoriteit onderzocht in de relatie tussen 
procedurele rechtvaardigheid en vrijwillige belasting-naleving. Deze studie vindt dat een 
hoge (vs. lage) dwang-gebaseerde en lage (vs. hoge) legitieme macht van de 
belastingautoriteit de positieve relatie tussen procedurele rechtvaardigheid en vrijwillige 
belasting-naleving versterken. Het vindt ook dat alleen het interactie effect van procedurele 
rechtvaardigheid en legitieme macht op vrijwillige belasting-naleving wordt gemedieerd 
door (cognitie gebaseerd) vertrouwen.  
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de rol van identificatie met de natie als moderator van het 
interactie effect van procedurele rechtvaardigheid en vertrouwen in de belastingautoriteit op 
vrijwillige belasting-naleving onderzocht. Er wordt in twee afzonderlijke steekproeven steun 
gevonden voor de voorspelling dat het interactie effect van procedurele rechtvaardigheid en 
vertrouwen op vrijwillige belasting-naleving alleen gevonden wordt onder burgers die zich 
zwak (in plaats van sterk) identificeren met de natie.  
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de legitimiteit van de belastingautoriteit als moderator voor 
het interactie effect van procedurele en distributieve rechtvaardigheid bij het stimuleren van 
vrijwillige belasting-naleving onderzocht. In twee studies wordt gevonden dat hoge (vs. 
lage) legitieme macht het interactie effect van procedurele en distributieve rechtvaardigheid 
op vrijwillige belasting-naleving versterkt. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden in detail de empirische bevindingen van dit proefschrift 
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bediscussieerd, met een nadruk op hun theoretische en praktische bijdragen en beperkingen. 
 
  
146 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It is quite normal to expect PhD study as a demanding long scientific journey that instils new 
pieces of knowledge and information at all its steps. This long journey in my PhD entailed 
the assistance of many without whose contributions finalizing it would even have been more 
difficult. God deserves primacy in my praise for tremendously helping me through this 
challenging and patience-exhausting journey. I would also never have successfully 
completed this thesis without the assistance of numerous people who I am deeply indebted 
to. 
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to my 
supervisor and promotor, prof.dr. Marius Van Dijke, for his diligence and patience to 
critically comment on each piece of my work in a way I could learn from his 
experience. Without his guidance, support and strict follow up during the most critical 
phases of my PhD journey, I would not have been able to accomplish the study. To 
him, I wish to say ‘You are exceptionally gifted and a born-to-teach supervisor and 
researcher!’ 
My sincere gratitude also goes to my co-supervisor, associate prof.dr. Peter 
Verboon, for his willingness to assist me wherever I sought his expertise. His 
graciousness and encouragement are exemplary that I have learned much from. He has 
never reserved his statistical skills even for manuscripts to which he was not my 
coauthor. To him I wish to say, ‘Thank you for your wonderful skills and polite 
approach!’ 
Dr. Bertha Vallejo, coordinator of the CentER Development Research 
Institute (IVO)-Tilburg University, deserves my gratefulness for her consistent support 
in and facilitation of my PhD study with genuine concern. I also sincerely thank the 
Netherlands organization for international cooperation in higher education (Nuffic) and 
Ethiopian Civil Service University respectively for the financial support and study time 
allotment for my study. 
I owe my peers, Zewdie Bezabih, Fikir Abere, Ababu Defere, Baynesagn 
Asfaw, Getachew Woldemariam, Deribe Assefa, Etefa Tola, Kebede Geneti, Teshale 
Getu, and Merga Mekuria, intense gratitude for their assistance in data collection, 
147 
 
 
encouragement, and genuine concerns during my PhD journey. Special thanks also go 
to Tesfaye Chofana, Belay File, and Rahel Jigi who generously helped me analyze data 
in Stata software.  
Finally, there are my wife and children who have given me much happiness 
and kept me hopping. My daughters—Roman  and Jinenus—and my son—Million—
have grown up watching me study and sympathizing the challenge of balancing PhD 
work and family life; hence deserve my sincere gratefulness. More than anyone, my 
wife, Netsie, deserves my sincere appreciation and lots of thanks for her love, care for 
our kids, and all encouragement she offered me throughout the PhD trajectory. 
 
  
148 
 
 
  
149 
 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Lemessa Bayissa Gobena was born on June 21, 1973 in 
Wollega, Ethiopia. He completed his high school in Gida 
Ayana Abiot Fire Senior Secondary School in Wollega, 
Ethiopia. He earned a two year diploma in Mathematics from 
Bahir Dar Teachers’ College in 1993. He graduated from 
Ethiopian Civil Service College with Bachelor of Arts degree 
in Accounting in 2001. He continued his study and graduated 
in Masters of Science in Accounting and Finance from Addis 
Ababa University in 2005. He started his PhD research in 2012 in Erasmus University 
Rotterdam under the supervision of professors Marius Van Dijke and Peter Verboon. 
Lemessa’s research focuses on authorities’ fairness and their use of power in securing 
cooperative behaviors. His research interests are exploring how less democratic authorities 
could be viewed by their followers as fair and trustworthy in order to enjoy voluntary 
deference to their decisions and goals. His research has been published in a leading peer-
reviewed journal, Journal of Economic Psychology. 
  
150 
 
 
  
151 
 
 
PhD Portfolio 
Educational background 
2004-2005 Master of Science in Accounting and Finance, Addis Ababa 
University 
 CGPA: 3.71/4.00 
 Thesis title: Analysis of Ethiopian Tax Administration: The Case 
of Employment and Business Income Taxes. 
1998-2001 Bachelor of Arts in Accounting, Ethiopian Civil Service 
College 
 CGPA: 3.99/4.00 
1992-1993 Diploma in Mathematics, Bahir Dar Teachers’ College 
 CGPA: 3.76/4.00 
Publications 
Asfaw, M. A., Argaw, M. D., & Gobena, L. B. (2015). The Impact of Training and 
Development on Employee Performance and Effectiveness: A Case Study of 
District Five Administration Office, Bole Sub-City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Journal of Human Resource and Sustainability Studies, 3(2015), 188-202. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jhrss.2015.34025 
 
Bekana, D. M., Gobena, L. B., & Yibrah, D. G. (2014). Evaluation of Ethiopian tax 
administration system: Emphasis on taxpayers' compliance. Journal of 
Business and Administrative Studies, 6(2), 46-75.  
 
Gobena, L. B., & Van Dijke, M. (2016). Power, justice, and trust: A moderated 
mediation analysis of tax compliance among Ethiopian business owners. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 52(2016), 24-37. doi:  
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.11.004 
 
152 
 
 
Gobena, L. B., & Van Dijke, M. (2017). Fear and Caring: Procedural Justice, Trust, and 
Collective Identification as Antecedents of Voluntary Tax Compliance. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 62(2017), 1-16. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.05.005 
 
Manuscript under review: 
Gobena, L. B., Verboon, P., & Van Dijke, M. ___. Does Legitimacy Matter? A Three-
way Interaction between Procedural Justice, Distributive Justice, and 
Legitimate Power on Voluntary Tax Compliance. Under review at Journal of 
Business Ethics 
Selected PhD Courses 
▪ Experimental Research Methods, Tilburg University 
▪ Academic writing, Tilburg University (training) 
▪ Narrative Analyses of Interview Data, Tilburg University (training) 
▪ Scientific Integrity in Research in Management 
▪ Research Seminars
  
 
The ERIM PhD Serie 
 
The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management 
defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated 
to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM 
PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of 
Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam (EUR). 
 
Dissertations in the last five years 
 
Abbink, E.J., Crew Management in Passenger Rail Transport, Promotors: Prof. 
L.G. Kroon & Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2014-325-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76927 
 
Acar, O.A., Crowdsourcing for Innovation: Unpacking Motivational, Knowledge and   
Relational Mechanisms of Innovative Behavior in Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotor: 
Prof. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2014-321-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76076 
 
Akemu, O., Corporate Responses to Social Issues: Essays in Social Entrepreneurship and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Promotors: Prof. G.M. Whiteman & Dr S.P. Kennedy, 
EPS-2017-392-ORG, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95768 
 
Akin Ates, M., Purchasing and Supply Management at the Purchase Category Level: 
Strategy, structure and performance, Promotors: Prof. J.Y.F. Wynstra & Dr E.M. 
van Raaij, EPS-2014-300-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50283 
 
Akpinar, E., Consumer Information Sharing, Promotor: Prof. A. Smidts,  
EPS-2013-297-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50140 
 
Alexander, L., People, Politics, and Innovation: A Process Perspective, Promotors: 
Prof. H.G. Barkema & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2014-331-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77209 
 
Alexiou, A. Management of Emerging Technologies and the Learning Organization: 
Lessons from the Cloud and Serious Games Technology, Promotors: Prof. S.J. Magala, 
Prof. M.C. Schippers and Dr I. Oshri, EPS-2016-404-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93818 
 
  
 
Almeida e Santos Nogueira, R.J. de, Conditional Density Models Integrating Fuzzy and 
Probabilistic Representations of Uncertainty, Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. J.M.C. 
Sousa, EPS-2014-310-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51560 
 
Bannouh, K., Measuring and Forecasting Financial Market Volatility using High-
frequency Data, Promotor: Prof. D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2013-273-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38240 
 
Ben-Menahem, S.M., Strategic Timing and Proactiveness of Organizations, Promotors: 
Prof. H.W. Volberda & Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2013-278-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39128 
 
Benschop, N, Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels, Promotors: 
Prof. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. M. Keil & Dr A.L.P. Nuijten,  
EPS-2015-375-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79408 
 
Berg, W.E. van den, Understanding Salesforce Behavior using Genetic Association 
Studies, Promotor: Prof. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2014-311-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51440 
 
Beusichem, H.C. van, Firms and Financial Markets: Empirical Studies on the 
Informational Value of Dividends, Governance and Financial Reporting, Promotors: Prof. 
A. de Jong & Dr G. Westerhuis, EPS-2016-378-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93079 
 
Bliek, R. de, Empirical Studies on the Economic Impact of Trust, Promotor: Prof. 
J. Veenman & Prof. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2015-324-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78159 
 
Boons, M., Working Together Alone in the Online Crowd: The Effects of Social 
Motivations and Individual Knowledge Backgrounds on the Participation and 
Performance of Members of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotors: Prof. H.G. 
Barkema & Dr D.A. Stam, EPS-2014-306-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50711 
 
Bouman, P., Passengers, Crowding and Complexity: Models for Passenger Oriented 
Public Transport, Prof. L.G. Kroon, Prof. A. Schöbel & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest,  
EPS-2017-420-LIS, https://repub.eur.nl/ 
 
Brazys, J., Aggregated Marcoeconomic News and Price Discovery, Promotor:  
Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-351-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78243 
 
Byington, E., Exploring Coworker Relationships: Antecedents and Dimensions of 
Interpersonal Fit, Coworker Satisfaction, and Relational Models, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van 
Knippenberg, EPS-2013-292-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41508 
 
Cancurtaran, P., Essays on Accelerated Product Development, Promotors: Prof. F. 
  
 
Langerak & Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, EPS-2014-317-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76074 
 
Caron, E.A.M., Explanation of Exceptional Values in Multi-dimensional Business 
Databases, Promotors: Prof. H.A.M. Daniels & Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2013-296-
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50005 
 
Carvalho, L. de, Knowledge Locations in Cities: Emergence and Development Dynamics, 
Promotor: Prof. L. Berg, EPS-2013-274-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38449 
 
Chammas, G., Portfolio concentration, Promotor: Prof. J. Spronk, EPS-2017-410-F&E, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/94975 
 
Cranenburgh, K.C. van, Money or Ethics: Multinational corporations and religious 
organisations operating in an era of corporate responsibility, Prof. L.C.P.M. Meijs, Prof. 
R.J.M. van Tulder & Dr D. Arenas, EPS-2016-385-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93104 
 
Consiglio, I., Others: Essays on Interpersonal and Consumer Behavior,  
Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2016-366-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79820 
 
Cox, R.H.G.M., To Own, To Finance, and To Insure - Residential Real Estate Revealed, 
Promotor: Prof. D. Brounen, EPS-2013-290-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40964 
 
Darnihamedani, P. Individual Characteristics, Contextual Factors and Entrepreneurial 
Behavior, Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik & S.J.A. Hessels, EPS-2016-360-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93280 
 
Dennerlein, T. Empowering Leadership and Employees’ Achievement Motivations: the 
Role of Self-Efficacy and Goal Orientations in the Empowering Leadership Process, 
Promotors: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Dr J. Dietz, EPS-2017-414-ORG, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/98438 
 
Deng, W., Social Capital and Diversification of Cooperatives, Promotor: Prof. G.W.J. 
Hendrikse, EPS-2015-341-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77449 
 
Depecik, B.E., Revitalizing brands and brand: Essays on Brand and Brand Portfolio 
Management Strategies, Promotors: Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, Dr Y.M. van Everdingen and 
Dr M.B. Ataman, EPS-2016-406-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93507 
 
Dollevoet, T.A.B., Delay Management and Dispatching in Railways,  
Promotor: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2013-272-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38241 
 
Duyvesteyn, J.G. Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets, Promotors:  
Prof. P. Verwijmeren & Prof. M.P.E. Martens, EPS-2015-361-F&A, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/79033 
 
  
 
Duursema, H., Strategic Leadership: Moving Beyond the Leader-Follower Dyad, 
Promotor: Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2013-279-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39129 
 
Elemes, A, Studies on Determinants and Consequences  
of Financial Reporting Quality, Promotor: Prof. E. Peek, EPS-2015-354-F&A, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/79037 
 
Ellen, S. ter, Measurement, Dynamics, and Implications of Heterogeneous Beliefs in 
Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-343-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78191 
 
Erlemann, C., Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Impact of the Organizational 
Environment, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2016-376-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79409 
 
Eskenazi, P.I., The Accountable Animal, Promotor: Prof. F.G.H. Hartmann, EPS- 
2015-355-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78300 
 
Evangelidis, I., Preference Construction under Prominence, Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. 
van Osselaer, EPS-2015-340-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78202 
 
Faber, N., Structuring Warehouse Management, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M. de Koster & 
Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2015-336-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78603 
 
Feng, Y., The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Leadership 
Structure: Impacts on strategic change and firm performance, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van 
den Bosch, Prof. H.W. Volberda & Dr J.S. Sidhu, EPS-2017-389-S&E, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/98470 
 
Fernald, K., The Waves of Biotechnological Innovation in Medicine: Interfirm Cooperation 
Effects and a Venture Capital Perspective, Promotors: Prof. E. Claassen, Prof. H.P.G. 
Pennings & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2015-371-S&E,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79120 
 
Fisch, C.O., Patents and trademarks: Motivations, antecedents, and value in industrialized 
and emerging markets, Promotors: Prof. J.H. Block, Prof. H.P.G.  Pennings & Prof. A.R. 
Thurik, EPS-2016-397-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94036 
 
Fliers, P.T., Essays on Financing and Performance: The role of firms, banks and board, 
Promotor: Prof. A. de Jong & Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, EPS-2016-388-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93019 
 
Fourne, S.P., Managing Organizational Tensions: A Multi-Level Perspective on 
Exploration, Exploitation and Ambidexterity, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen & Prof. 
S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-318-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76075 
  
 
 
Gaast, J.P. van der, Stochastic Models for Order Picking Systems, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M 
de Koster & Prof. I.J.B.F. Adan, EPS-2016-398-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93222 
 
Giurge, L., A Test of Time; A temporal and dynamic approach to power and ethics, 
Promotors: Prof. M.H. van Dijke & Prof. D. De Cremer, EPS-2017-412-ORG, 
https://repub.eur.nl/ 
 
Glorie, K.M., Clearing Barter Exchange Markets: Kidney Exchange and Beyond, 
Promotors: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof. J.J. van de Klundert, EPS-2014-329-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77183 
 
Hekimoglu, M., Spare Parts Management of Aging Capital Products, Promotor: Prof. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2015-368-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79092 
 
Heyde Fernandes, D. von der, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Reminders, Promotor: 
Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2013-295-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41514 
  
Hogenboom, A.C., Sentiment Analysis of Text Guided by Semantics and Structure, 
Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2015-369-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79034 
 
Hogenboom, F.P., Automated Detection of Financial Events in News Text, Promotors: 
Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2014-326-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77237 
 
Hollen, R.M.A., Exploratory Studies into Strategies to Enhance Innovation-Driven 
International Competitiveness in a Port Context: Toward Ambidextrous Ports, Promotors: 
Prof. F.A.J. Van Den Bosch & Prof. H.W.Volberda, EPS-2015-372-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78881 
 
Hout, D.H. van, Measuring Meaningful Differences: Sensory Testing Based Decision 
Making in an Industrial Context; Applications of Signal Detection Theory and Thurstonian 
Modelling, Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof. G.B. Dijksterhuis, EPS- 
2014-304-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50387 
 
Houwelingen, G.G. van, Something To Rely On, Promotors: Prof. D. de Cremer & 
Prof. M.H. van Dijke, EPS-2014-335-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77320 
 
Hurk, E. van der, Passengers, Information, and Disruptions, Promotors: Prof. L.G. 
Kroon & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2015-345-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78275 
 
Iseger, P. den, Fourier and Laplace Transform Inversion with Applications in Finance, 
Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2014-322-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76954 
 
  
 
Jaarsveld, W.L. van, Maintenance Centered Service Parts Inventory Control, Promotor: 
Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2013-288-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39933 
 
Khanagha, S., Dynamic Capabilities for Managing Emerging Technologies, Promotor: 
Prof. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2014-339-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77319 
 
Khattab, J., Make Minorities Great Again: a contribution to workplace equity by 
identifying and addressing constraints and privileges, Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Dr A. 
Nederveen Pieterse, EPS-2017-421-ORG, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/99311 
 
Kil, J., Acquisitions Through a Behavioral and Real Options Lens, Promotor: Prof. 
H.T.J. Smit, EPS-2013-298-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50142 
 
 
Klooster, E. van’t, Travel to Learn: the Influence of Cultural Distance on Competence 
Development in Educational Travel, Promotors: Prof. F.M. Go & Prof. P.J. van 
Baalen, EPS-2014-312-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51462 
 
Koendjbiharie, S.R., The Information-Based View on Business Network Performance: 
Revealing the Performance of Interorganizational Networks, Promotors: Prof. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2014-315-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51751 
 
Koning, M., The Financial Reporting Environment: The Role of the Media, Regulators 
and Auditors, Promotors: Prof. G.M.H. Mertens & Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, 
EPS-2014-330-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77154 
 
Konter, D.J., Crossing Borders with HRM: An Inquiry of the Influence of Contextual 
Differences in the Adoption and Effectiveness of HRM, Promotors: Prof. J. Paauwe 
& Dr L.H. Hoeksema, EPS-2014-305-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50388 
 
Korkmaz, E., Bridging Models and Business: Understanding Heterogeneity in Hidden 
Drivers of Customer Purchase Behavior, Promotors: Prof. S.L. van de Velde & 
Prof. D. Fok, EPS-2014-316-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76008 
 
Krämer, R., A license to mine? Community organizing against multinational corporations, 
Promotors: Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder & Prof. G.M. Whiteman, EPS-2016-383-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94072 
 
Kroezen, J.J., The Renewal of Mature Industries: An Examination of the Revival of the 
Dutch Beer Brewing Industry, Promotor: Prof. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2014- 
333-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77042 
 
Kysucky, V., Access to Finance in a Cros-Country Context, Promotor:  
Prof. L. Norden, EPS-2015-350-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78225 
  
 
 
Lee, C.I.S.G, Big Data in Management Research: Exploring New Avenues, Promotors: 
Prof. S.J. Magala & Dr W.A. Felps, EPS-2016-365-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79818 
 
Legault-Tremblay, P.O., Corporate Governance During Market Transition: 
Heterogeneous responses to Institution Tensions in China, Promotor: Prof. B. Krug, EPS-
2015-362-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78649 
 
Lenoir, A.S. Are You Talking to Me? Addressing Consumers in a Globalised World, 
Promotors: Prof. S. Puntoni & Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2015-363-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79036 
 
Leunissen, J.M., All Apologies: On the Willingness of Perpetrators to Apologize, 
Promotors: Prof. D. de Cremer & Dr M. van Dijke, EPS-2014-301-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50318 
 
Li, D., Supply Chain Contracting for After-sales Service and Product Support, Promotor: 
Prof. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2015-347-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78526 
 
Li, Z., Irrationality: What, Why and How, Promotors: Prof. H. Bleichrodt,  
Prof. P.P. Wakker, & Prof. K.I.M. Rohde, EPS-2014-338-MKT, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77205 
 
Liu, N., Behavioral Biases in Interpersonal Contexts, Supervisors: Prof. A. Baillon &  
Prof. H. Bleichrodt, EPS-2017-408-MKT, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95487 
 
Liang, Q.X., Governance, CEO Identity, and Quality Provision of Farmer Cooperatives, 
Promotor: Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2013-281-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39253 
 
Liket, K., Why ’Doing Good’ is not Good Enough: Essays on Social Impact Measurement, 
Promotors: Prof. H.R. Commandeur & Dr K.E.H. Maas, EPS-2014-307-STR, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51130 
 
Loos, M.J.H.M. van der, Molecular Genetics and Hormones: New Frontiers in 
Entrepreneurship Research, Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik, Prof. P.J.F. Groenen, 
& Prof. A. Hofman, EPS-2013-287-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40081 
 
Lu, Y., Data-Driven Decision Making in Auction Markets, Promotors: Prof. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof. W. Ketter, EPS-2014-314-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51543 
 
Ma, Y., The Use of Advanced Transportation Monitoring Data for Official Statistics, 
Promotors: Prof. L.G. Kroon and Dr J. van Dalen, EPS-2016-391-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/80174 
 
Manders, B., Implementation and Impact of ISO 9001, Promotor: Prof. K. Blind, 
  
 
EPS-2014-337-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77412 
 
Mell, J.N., Connecting Minds: On The Role of Metaknowledge in Knowledge 
Coordination, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2015-359-ORG,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/78951 
 
Meulen,van der, D., The Distance Dilemma: the effect of flexible working practices on 
performance in the digital workplace, Promotors: Prof. H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof. P.J. 
van Baalen, EPS-2016-403-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94033  
 
Micheli, M.R., Business Model Innovation: A Journey across Managers’ Attention and 
Inter-Organizational Networks, Promotor: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen, EPS-2015-344-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78241 
 
Milea, V., News Analytics for Financial Decision Support, Promotor: Prof. U. 
Kaymak, EPS-2013-275-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38673 
 
Moniz, A, Textual Analysis of Intangible Information, Promotors: Prof. C.B.M. van Riel, 
Prof. F.M.G de Jong & Dr G.A.J.M. Berens, EPS-2016-393-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93001 
 
Mulder, J. Network design and robust scheduling in liner shipping, Promotors: Prof. R. 
Dekker & Dr W.L. van Jaarsveld, EPS-2016-384-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/80258 
 
Naumovska, I., Socially Situated Financial Markets: A Neo-Behavioral Perspective on 
Firms, Investors and Practices, Promotors: Prof. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens & Prof. A. 
de Jong, EPS-2014-319-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76084 
 
Neerijnen, P., The Adaptive Organization: the socio-cognitive antecedents of ambidexterity 
and individual exploration, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen, P.P.M.A.R. Heugens & Dr 
T.J.M. Mom, EPS-2016-358-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93274 
 
Okbay, A., Essays on Genetics and the Social Sciences, Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik, 
Prof. Ph.D. Koellinger & Prof. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2017-413-S&E, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95489 
 
Oord, J.A. van, Essays on Momentum Strategies in Finance, Promotor: Prof. H.K. van 
Dijk, EPS-2016-380-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/80036 
 
Peng, X., Innovation, Member Sorting, and Evaluation of Agricultural Cooperatives, 
Promotor: Prof. G.W.J. Hendriks, EPS-2017-409-ORG, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/94976 
 
Pennings, C.L.P., Advancements in Demand Forecasting: Methods and Behavior, 
Promotors: Prof. L.G. Kroon, Prof. H.W.G.M. van Heck & Dr J. van Dalen, EPS-2016-
400-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94039 
  
 
 
Peters, M., Machine Learning Algorithms for Smart Electricity Markets, Promotor: 
Prof. W. Ketter, EPS-2014-332-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77413 
 
Pocock, M., Status Inequalities in Business Exchange Relations in Luxury Markets, 
Promotors: Prof. C.B.M. van Riel & Dr G.A.J.M. Berens, EPS-2017-346-ORG, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/98647 
 
Porck, J., No Team is an Island: An Integrative View of Strategic Consensus between 
Groups, Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS- 
2013-299-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50141 
 
Pozharliev, R., Social Neuromarketing: The role of social context in measuring advertising 
effectiveness, Promotors: Prof. W.J.M.I. Verbeke & Prof. J.W. van Strien, 
 EPS-2017-402-MKT, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95528 
 
Pronker, E.S., Innovation Paradox in Vaccine Target Selection, Promotors: 
 Prof. H.J.H.M. Claassen & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2013-282-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39654 
 
Protzner, S. Mind the gap between demand and supply: A behavioral perspective on 
demand forecasting, Promotors: Prof. S.L. van de Velde & Dr L. Rook, EPS-2015-364-
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79355 
 
Pruijssers, J.K., An Organizational Perspective on Auditor Conduct, Promotors: 
Prof. J. van Oosterhout & Prof. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2015-342-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78192 
 
Retel Helmrich, M.J., Green Lot-Sizing, Promotor: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS- 
2013-291-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41330 
 
Rietdijk, W.J.R. The Use of Cognitive Factors for Explaining Entrepreneurship, 
Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik & Prof. I.H.A. Franken, EPS-2015-356-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79817 
 
Rietveld, N., Essays on the Intersection of Economics and Biology, Promotors: Prof. 
A.R. Thurik, Prof. Ph.D. Koellinger, Prof. P.J.F. Groenen, & Prof. A. Hofman, 
EPS-2014-320-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76907 
 
Rösch, D. Market Efficiency and Liquidity, Promotor: Prof. M.A. van Dijk,  
EPS-2015-353-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79121 
 
Roza, L., Employee Engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility: A collection of 
essays, Promotor: L.C.P.M. Meijs, EPS-2016-396-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93254 
 
  
 
Rubbaniy, G., Investment Behaviour of Institutional Investors, Promotor: Prof. 
W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2013-284-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40068 
 
Schoonees, P. Methods for Modelling Response Styles, Promotor: Prof.dr P.J.F. Groenen,  
EPS-2015-348-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79327 
 
Schouten, M.E., The Ups and Downs of Hierarchy: the causes and consequences of 
hierarchy struggles and positional loss, Promotors; Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Dr L.L. 
Greer, EPS-2016-386-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/80059 
 
Shahzad, K., Credit Rating Agencies, Financial Regulations and the Capital Markets, 
Promotor: Prof. G.M.H. Mertens, EPS-2013-283-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39655 
 
Smit, J. Unlocking Business Model Innovation: A look through the keyhole at the inner 
workings of Business Model Innovation, Promotor: H.G. Barkema, EPS-2016-399-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93211 
 
Sousa, M.J.C. de, Servant Leadership to the Test: New Perspectives and Insights, 
Promotors: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Dr D. van Dierendonck, EPS-2014-313-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51537 
 
 
Spliet, R., Vehicle Routing with Uncertain Demand, Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, 
EPS-2013-293-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41513 
 
Staadt, J.L., Leading Public Housing Organisation in a Problematic Situation: A Critical 
Soft Systems Methodology Approach, Promotor: Prof. S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-308- 
ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50712 
 
Stallen, M., Social Context Effects on Decision-Making: A Neurobiological Approach, 
Promotor: Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2013-285-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39931 
 
Szatmari, B., We are (all) the champions: The effect of status in the implementation of 
innovations, Promotors: Prof J.C.M & Dr D. Deichmann, EPS-2016-401-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94633 
 
Tarakci, M., Behavioral Strategy: Strategic Consensus, Power and Networks, Promotors: 
Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg & Prof. P.J.F. Groenen, EPS-2013-280-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39130 
 
Tuijl, E. van, Upgrading across Organisational and Geographical Configurations, 
Promotor: Prof. L. van den Berg, EPS-2015-349-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78224 
 
Tuncdogan, A., Decision Making and Behavioral Strategy: The Role of Regulatory Focus 
in Corporate Innovation Processes, Promotors: Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, 
  
 
Prof. H.W. Volberda, & Prof. T.J.M. Mom, EPS-2014-334-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76978 
 
Uijl, S. den, The Emergence of De-facto Standards, Promotor: Prof. K. Blind, 
EPS-2014-328-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77382 
 
Vagias, D., Liquidity, Investors and International Capital Markets, Promotor: Prof. 
M.A. van Dijk, EPS-2013-294-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41511 
 
Valogianni, K. Sustainable Electric Vehicle Management using Coordinated Machine 
Learning, Promotors: Prof. H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof. W. Ketter, EPS-2016-387-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93018 
 
Vandic, D., Intelligent Information Systems for Web Product Search, Promotors: Prof. U. 
Kaymak & Dr Frasincar, EPS-2017-405-LIS, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/95490 
 
Veelenturf, L.P., Disruption Management in Passenger Railways: Models for Timetable, 
Rolling Stock and Crew Rescheduling, Promotor: Prof. L.G. Kroon,  
EPS-2014-327-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77155 
 
Venus, M., Demystifying Visionary Leadership: In search of the essence of effective 
vision communication, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2013-289- 
ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40079 
 
Vermeer, W., Propagation in Networks:The impact of information processing at the actor 
level on system-wide propagation dynamics, Promotor: Prof. P.H.M.Vervest, EPS-2015-
373-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79325 
 
Versluis, I., Prevention of the Portion Size Effect, Promotors: Prof. Ph.H.B.F. Franses & 
Dr E.K. Papies, EPS-2016-382-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79880 
 
Vishwanathan, P., Governing for Stakeholders: How Organizations May Create or 
Destroy Value for their Stakeholders, Promotors: Prof. J. van Oosterhout &  
Prof. L.C.P.M. Meijs, EPS-2016-377-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93016 
 
Visser, V.A., Leader Affect and Leadership Effectiveness: How leader affective displays 
influence follower outcomes, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg,  
EPS-2013-286-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40076 
 
Vlaming, R. de., Linear Mixed Models in Statistical Genetics, Prof. A.R. Thurik, 
Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof. Ph.D. Koellinger, EPS-2017-416-S&E, 
https://repub.eur.nl/pub/100428 
 
Vries, J. de, Behavioral Operations in Logistics, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M de Koster & 
Prof. D.A. Stam, EPS-2015-374-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79705 
  
 
 
Wagenaar, J.C., Practice Oriented Algorithmic Disruption Management in Passenger 
Railways, Prof. L.G. Kroon & Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2016-390-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93177 
 
Wang, P., Innovations, status, and networks, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen & Dr V.J.A. 
van de Vrande, EPS-2016-381-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93176 
 
Wang, R. Corporate Environmentalism in China, Promotors: Prof. P.P.M.A.R Heugens & 
Dr F.Wijen, EPS-2017-417-S&E, https://repub.eur.nl/pub/99987 
 
Wang, T., Essays in Banking and Corporate Finance, Promotors: Prof. L. Norden 
& Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, EPS-2015-352-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78301 
 
Wang, Y., Corporate Reputation Management: Reaching Out to Financial Stakeholders, 
Promotor: Prof. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2013-271-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38675 
 
Weenen, T.C., On the Origin and Development of the Medical Nutrition Industry, 
Promotors: Prof. H.R. Commandeur & Prof. H.J.H.M. Claassen, EPS-2014-309-S&E, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51134 
 
Wessels, C., Flexible Working Practices: How Employees Can Reap the Benefits for 
Engagement and Performance, Promotors: Prof. H.W.G.M. van Heck,  
Prof. P.J. van Baalen & Prof. M.C. Schippers, EPS-2017-418-LIS, https://repub.eur.nl/ 
 
 
Wolfswinkel, M., Corporate Governance, Firm Risk and Shareholder Value, Promotor: 
Prof. A. de Jong, EPS-2013-277-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39127 
 
Yang, S., Information Aggregation Efficiency of Prediction Markets, Promotor: 
Prof. H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2014-323-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77184 
 
Ypsilantis, P., The Design, Planning and Execution of Sustainable Intermodal Port-
hinterland Transport Networks, Promotors: Prof. R.A. Zuidwijk & Prof. L.G. Kroon,  
EPS-2016-395-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94375 
 
Yuferova, D. Price Discovery, Liquidity Provision, and Low-Latency Trading, Promotors: 
Prof. M.A. van Dijk & Dr D.G.J. Bongaerts, EPS-2016-379-F&A, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93017 
 
Zaerpour, N., Efficient Management of Compact Storage Systems, Promotor: 
Prof. M.B.M. de Koster, EPS-2013-276-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38766 
 
  
 
Zuber, F.B., Looking at the Others: Studies on (un)ethical behavior and social 
relationships in organizations, Promotor: Prof. S.P. Kaptein, EPS-2016-394-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94388 
 
436
LE
M
E
S
S
A
 B
A
Y
IS
S
A
 G
O
B
E
N
A
  -  To
w
a
rd
s In
te
g
ra
tin
g
 A
n
te
ce
d
e
n
ts o
f V
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 Ta
x
 C
o
m
p
lia
n
ce
LEMESSA BAYISSA GOBENA
Towards Integrating 
Antecedents of Voluntary  
Tax Compliance
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR)
Erasmus Research Institute of Management
Mandeville (T) Building
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
T +31 10 408 1182
E info@erim.eur.nl
W www.erim.eur.nl
Lemessa Bayissa Gobena was born on June 21, 1973 in Wollega, Ethiopia. He completed his high school 
in Gida Ayana Abiot Fire Senior Secondary School in Wollega, Ethiopia. He earned a two year diploma in 
Mathematics from Bahir Dar Teachers’ College in 1993. He graduated from Ethiopian Civil Service College 
with Bachelor of Arts degree in Accounting in 2001. He continued his study and graduated in Masters 
of Science in Accounting and Finance from Addis Ababa University in 2005. He started his PhD research 
in 2012 in Erasmus University Rotterdam under the supervision of professors Marius Van Dijke and Peter 
Verboon.
Lemessa’s research focuses on authorities’ fairness and their use of power in securing cooperative 
behaviors. His research interests are exploring how less democratic authorities could be viewed by their 
followers as fair and trustworthy in order to enjoy voluntary deference to their decisions and goals. His 
research has been published in a leading peer-reviewed journal, Journal of Economic Psychology.
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
ERIM PhD Series 
Research in Management
